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The United States is virtually the only country in the world that
does not award attorney fees to the party prevailing in a lawsuit.1
Under the "American Rule," both parties pay their own attorney
fees.2 Virtually every other legal system follows the "English
Rule," where the losing party pays the prevailing party's attorney
3
fees.

1. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LTIGATION EXPLOSION 329-30 (1991); Joyce Dougherty, After
Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 257, 268 (1976)

[hereinafter After Alyeska].
2.

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co,, 396 U.S. 375,391-92 (1970); Bradley L. Smith, Comment,

Three Attorney Fee-Shiftng Rules and ContingencyFees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90
MICH. L. Rnv. 2154,2154 n.1 (1992) [hereinafter Settlement Incentives]. The United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the American Rule in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S.
240 (1975). Id The American Rule denies access to the courts to a large group of persons who lack
both the sufficient resources to hire attorneys, and seek only nominal or equitable damages, thus

making a contingency fee arrangement impracticable. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th CoNo., 2D SESS.
(1976); S.REP. No. 1011, 94th CONG., 2D Sass. (1976); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 483 U.S. 711, 749 (1987) (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.9, at 537 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Settlement Incentives, supra note 2, at 2154. In response to

criticisms against the American Rule, a few commentators recommend adopting a modified form of
the English Rule to encourage pre-trial settlement of claims and reduce litigation. Id (citing
PRESIDENT'S COuNcIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JusTicE REFORM IN AMERICA 1,

24-25 (1991)). The President's Council on Competitiveness, formerly chaired by Vice-President Dan
Quayle, has recommended adopting a modified form of the English Rule in diversity cases, which
would award attorney fees to the prevailing party. Id This modified rule would limit indemnification
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Congress and the state legislatures recognized that the
American Rule could lead to harsh results, and created numerous
statutory exceptions which shift attorney fees to the non-prevailing
party.' In fact, Congress has significantly restricted the scope of
the American Rule by enacting nearly two hundred federal fee
shifting statutes.5 The California Legislature has enacted 235 fee
shifting statutes.' These provisions encourage private parties to
enforce important federal and state statutes, by shifting the winning

of the winning party's attorney fees to the losing party's own legal fees. L Contra Ralph Nader,
Public Citizen press release (Aug. 13, 1992), quoted in Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Aug. 14,
1991, at A3 (stating that large corporations would use this new rule to intimidate victims, by
increasing the financial risks of losing a case); Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, ABA J., Nov.
1992, at 55-57 [hereinafter The English Rule] (stating that settlement offers in England are
significantly lower for plaintiffs who pay their own solicitors, versus those cases where either legal
aid or a labor union pays the attorney); Ud (explaining how a modified English Rule would almost
certainly increase, rather than decrease, the amount of litigation).
4. Fee shifting statutes typically require the "non-prevailing party" to pay the attorney fees
of the "prevailing party." See infra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text (examining the language of
fee shifting statutes); infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text (describing fee shifting statutes); see
also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1717(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (defining "prevailing party" as the party who
recovers greater relief in the action); id (stating that if the case is dismissed, there is no prevailing
party); CAL. CIV. Ploc. CODE § 1032 (West Supp. 1993) (defining "prevailing party" as a defendant
who obtains a dismissal, a defendant where neither party obtains relief, or the party whom the court
determines is the prevailing party).
5.
Note, Fee Simple: A Proposalto Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for Low-Income Litigants,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1988) [hereinafter Low-Income Litigants];Charles Silver, Comment,
Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure,70 TEX. L. REv. 865, 872 (1992)
[hereinafter New Fee Award Procedure];see HERBERT B. NEWBmG, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS, §
28.01, at 478 (1986 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS] (listing 136 federal fee
shifting provisions); New FeeAward Procedure,supra, at 866 (explaining how Congress has limited
the effects of the American Rule). The Supreme Court recognized that Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in direct response to the Court's
affirmation of the American Rule. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
6. See Attorney Fees, 1984 CAt. CoNrIIG EDuc. B. § 1.311, at 253-67 (listing 235
California fee shifting provisions).
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party's attorney fees to the losing party.7 These provisions also

deter violations of the statutes.8
Under the exceptions to the American Rule, there are three
primary methods for calculating attorney fees. First, the statute
itself may expressly mandate a certain calculation of attorney
fees.9 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a second
approach, under which the court considers twelve factors to
determine reasonable attorney fees."0 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals developed a third, more straight-forward approach which
calculates reasonable attorney fees by multiplying the number of
hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate."' The
United States Supreme Court adopted the latter approach, naming

7. For example, the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988, "is to ensure 'effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights
grievances." H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th CoNa., 2D SEss. (1976). Requiring the non-prevailing party
to pay the prevailing party's attorney fees leads to increased access to the courts, because an attorney
is more likely to take a case when the attorney has a higher probability of getting paid. See infra
notes 311-14 and accompanying text (discussing the risk aversion of lawyers). Many plaintiffs can
neither afford to pay an hourly fee, nor offer a contingent fee, since they are seeking only declaratory
or nominal relief. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2645 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). However, under the fee shifting provisions, if the attorney is successful, the attorney will
be paid by the other party. RuckeIshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983).
8.
Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240 (1975); New Fee Award Procedure,supra note 5, at 873-74.
9.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1031 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that an award of
attorney fees cannot exceed 20% of the amount of recovery); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West Supp.
1993) (providing that an award of attorney fees should be computed at a rate of $100 per hour, and
should not exceed $7,500). Fee shifting statutes are more typically drafted in broad terms, leaving
to the courts the task of devising equitable procedures to calculate attorney fees. New Fee Award
Procedure, supra note 5, at 866. Under these fee shifting statutes, courts seek to determine
reasonable attorney fees. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (recognizing that the
Civil Rights Attorney*s Fees Awards Act of 1976 requires determining a "reasonable fee"); Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (holding that the district court must determine what fee is
"reasonable").
10. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,717-19 (5th Cir. 1974); see
infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the twelve Johnson factors for determining
reasonable attorney fees).
11. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy
1), 487 F.2d 161, 167-68 (3rd Cir. 1973). In applying the lodestar model, the trial court generally
derives a reasonable rate from local rates charged by attorneys of comparable experience, skill, and
reputation. New Fee AwardProcedure,supranote 5, at 867; see ATrORNEY FEE AWARDs, supranote
5, at § 29.01, at 488 (listing market rates upheld by each federal circuit).
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it the lodestar model, and recognized that the lodestar could be
enhanced by using the factors identified by the Fifth Circuit."2
The lodestar merely provides the basic calculation of reasonable
attorney fees, and does not reflect all of the factors that determine
the market value of legal services.13 Courts have, therefore,
attempted to fully compensate attorneys by enhancing the lodestar
based on three factors: Delay in payment, exceptional results, and
the contingent nature of recovery.14 By enhancing the lodestar for
these factors, the trial court raises what would otherwise be an
unreasonably low fee, to a fee which better approximates the true
market value of an attorney's services."
The Supreme Court, in City of Burlington v. Dague,16 recently
eliminated an enhancement to the lodestar figure for the contingent
risk of nonrecovery.17 Although the Court limited its holding to
eliminating contingency enhancements under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act" and the Clean Water Act,' 9 the Court intended for
20
its decision to have a broader effect.

12. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Blum, 465 U.S. at 897; see infra notes 68-110 and
accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the lodestar approach).
13. ATroRNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 431, at 163.
14. ld; Hensley,461 U.S. at 434 n.9. A multiplier that enhances the basic lodestar calculation
for one of these factors does not represent a bonus or windfall to the attorney. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896
n.12, 897; ATroRNEY Fm AWARDS, supra note 5, § 4.29, at 161; see infra notes 111-170 and
accompanying text (discussing the three enhancements to the lodestar figure).
15. Weinbergerv. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., Nos. 89-0270,89-0273,89-0291,1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12073, at *62-63 (D. Me. July 30, 1992) (citing 2 M.Da RRIFN & A.WoI', COURT
AwARDED A-rfORNEYS FE § 16.04[1], at 16-122). These enhancements for delay in payment,
exceptional results, and the contingent nature of recovery, compensate counsel for prosecuting cases
where the probability of success is only moderate, and yet the attorney must invest substantial time.
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974)).
16. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
17. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44; see infra notes 171-244 and accompanying text (discussing
the Dague decision). The lodestar may still be enhanced for delay in payment and exceptional results.
See infra notes 388-96 and accompanying text (explaining how Dague only eliminated an
enhancement for the contingent nature of recovery).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988); see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing these
two environmental protection statutes).
20. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44; see infra notes 321-23 and accompanying text (discussing
the language in Dague which was meant to be, and has been interpreted broadly).
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This Note analyzes the reasoning and ramifications of City of
Burlington v. Dague.21 Part I surveys fee shifting statutes,
primarily in the civil rights and environmental areas, and examines
the development of the lodestar approach.22 Part II describes the
facts and procedural history of City of Burlington v. Dague and
reviews the majority and dissenting opinions.23 Finally, Part III
examines the added confusion in fee shifting jurisprudence created
by Dague, and the possibility of circumventing the Dague decision.
Part III also discusses the role Congress and state legislatures
should take in modifying fee shifting statutes.24
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand fee shifting jurisprudence, it is necessary
to contrast the traditional American method of compensating
attorneys with the traditional English method. The contrast between
the two rules provides the backdrop for a survey of fee shifting
statutes in the federal civil rights and environmental protection
arenas, and similar statutes in the State of California. 25 Fee
shifting statutes permit courts to award attorney fees, but do not
define what constitutes reasonable attorney fees, leading to the
development of the lodestar model.26 Yet the lodestar figure
cannot account for all of the variables that determine a fully
compensatory fee, and therefore, the court must enhance the
lodestar for certain unaccounted factors.27

21. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
22. See infra notes 25-170 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 171-244 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 245-413 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text (discussing federal and California fee
shifting statutes).
26. See infra notes 68-110 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the lodestar
model).
27. See infra notes 111-170 and accompanying text (discussing the possible enhancements to
the lodestar).
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A. English Rule vs. American Rule
The English Rule requires the losing party to pay the prevailing
party's attorney fees.28 All major common law countries, other
than the United States, follow the English Rule.29 English courts
routinely grant attorney fees and all other litigation expenses to
prevailing parties, and have done so for centuries."0 The object of
the English Rule is to indemnify the successful party for the
expense of vindicating the successful party's legal rights. 1
The American Rule, on the other hand, requires both parties to
pay their own attorney fees.32 The American Rule has consistently
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.33 In 1796, the
Court first stated, in Arcambel v. Wiseman,34 that the "general
practice" in the United States was to not award attorney fees as
part of damages.3 5 The Court ruled that federal courts could not
deviate from the general practice without express authorization
from Congress.36 A strict application of the American Rule leads
to harsh results, because many potential plaintiffs possess neither
the financial resources nor the possibility of obtaining a sufficiently

28. E.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 21.9, at 537; Settlement Incentives,supra note
2, at 2154.
29. See Neil Williams, Fee Shifing and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A. J. 859, 859
(1978) [hereinafter Fee Shifting] (noting that the American practice may be the most distinctive
feature of American Civil Procedure); AfterAlyeska, supranote 1, at 268 (stating that the American
practice differs from almost every other country in the world).

30.

Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants,96 HARV. L.

REv. 677, 678 (1983) [hereinafter Unsuccessfiul EnvironmentalLitigants].
31. Fee Shifting, supra note 29, at 859. The author states that the English Rule in modem
practice only partially indemnifies the prevailing party, because of fee schedules which set limits on
attorney fees. ld at 860; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Searchingfor Winners in a Loser Pays System,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 55 (explaining that different methods of financing litigation insulate parties
from being individually responsible for paying the prevailing party's attorney fees).
32. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970).
33. See, e.g., F. D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417
U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,717-18
(1967); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1879); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450
(1873); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363
(1852).
34. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
35. Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306.
36. Id.
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large recovery to attract competent counsel.37 If courts followed
the American Rule strictly, this would prevent many plaintiffs from
bringing meritorious claims.
Courts have mitigated the harshness of the American Rule by
employing equitable principles that shift the prevailing party's
attorney fees to the non-prevailing party.38 Legislatures also have
mitigated the harshness by enacting statutes which shift fees.39 In
mitigating the harshness of the American Rule, courts and
legislatures have developed three equitable principles: The common
fund, substantial benefit, and private attorney general doctrines. The
common fund doctrine permits a litigant, whose efforts have
created a fund from which others obtain benefit, to require the
beneficiaries to contribute to the costs of litigation, including
attorney fees.4" The substantial benefit doctrine permits a litigant,
whose efforts have procured a judgment that confers a substantial
benefit on members of an ascertainable class, to recover attorney
fees from the class.4 Finally, the private attorney general doctrine
awards attorney fees in successful suits against persons infringing
on important statutory and constitutional rights.42 The private
attorney general doctrine encourages suits that enforce a strong
public policy and benefit a large class of people.43 Each of these
three doctrines at least partially indemnifies the prevailing party's
attorney fees.

37. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II),
483 U.S. 711, 749 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th CONG., 2D SEsS.
(1976); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th CONG. 2D SEss. (1976).
38. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I1), 20 Cal. 3d 25, 35, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309, 141 Cal. Rptr.
315, 318 (1977) (citing Quinn v. State, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167, 539 P.2d 761, 764, 124 Cal. Rptr. 1,
4 (1975)); see supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining "prevailing party").
39. See, e.g., CAL CtV. CODE § 1717 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (permitting parties to a
contract to provide for fee shifting in the event of litigation); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (Vest
Supp. 1993) (codifying the private attorney general doctrine).
40. Serrano II, 20 Cal. 3d at 35, 569 P.2d at 1309, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
41. Id
42. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n. v. City Council, 23 Cal.3d 917,933,593 P.2d 200,208,
154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 511 (1979).
43. Id
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B. Fee Shifting Statutes
The primary purpose of fee shifting statutes is to make legal
services available to plaintiffs who might be discouraged or
foreclosed from bringing actions under the American Rule. Most
statutory fee shifting cases involve plaintiffs who seek only
nominal damages, equitable relief, or do not contract to pay their
attorneys a predetermined contingency percentage.' In the
absence of fee shifting provisions, a plaintiff who cannot afford to
pay an hourly fee would be unable to attract counsel.45 Since a
plaintiff's ability to attract competent counsel depends on the
certainty of payment to the attorney, fee shifting provisions aid
plaintiffs in attracting counsel by increasing the likelihood that an
adequate source will be available from which counsel will be
paid.46
Fee shifting also bolsters enforcement of important state and
federal laws.47 Legislatures have chosen to encourage claims in
particular areas by offering attorney fee awards. Due to these fee
shifting provisions, private plaintiffs who seek to enforce important
laws can attract competent counsel.4 ' The United States Congress
and the California Legislature have enacted a plethora of fee
shifting provisions.49

44. Settlement Incentives, supra note 2, at 2168; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Coiincil for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I1), 483 U.S. 711, 749 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th CONG., 2D SEss. (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1558,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); Settlement Incentives,supra note 2, at 2168 (stating that plaintiffs seeking nonpecuniary
relief should be able to attract competent counsel with fees equivalent to those available in other
types of litigation).
46. Delaware Valley I1, 483 U.S. at 736, 742-43 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
47. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th CoNG., 2D SEss. (1976).
48. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 742-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. See infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text (discussing federal and California fee
shifting statutes).
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1. FederalFee Shifting Statutes
Congress has passed nearly 200 fee shifting statutes.5" Federal
fee shifting statutes are quite diverse, and cover a wide range of
legal areas." Despite the breadth of federal fee shifting statutes,
Congress appears to have focused its attention on the civil rights
and environmental protection arenas.5 2
Federal civil rights statutes typically limit recovery to the
53
"prevailing," "substantially prevailing," or "successful" party.
Civil rights statutes can be classified according to how much
discretion the trial court has in awarding attorney fees. The
majority of civil rights statutes permit the court to award attorney

50. Low-Income Litigants, supra note 5, at 1232; New Fee Award Procedure,supra note 5,
at 872; see AToRNEY FEE AwARDs, supra note 5, § 28.01, at 478 (listing 136 federal fee shifting
provisions).
51. New Fee Award Procedure,supra note 5, at 872.
52. Id at 873-74; see infra notes 59-112 and accompanying text (listing examples of civil
rights and environmental statutes which permit fee shifting). Congress has also passed fee shifting

provisions in areas other than civil rights and environmental protection. See, e.g., Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988) (stating that the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party,
but they may not be awarded either to or against the United States government); Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), 2060(0, 2072(a), 2073 (1988) (permitting the court to award
attorney fees, even against the United States government, if in the interest of justice); Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988) (stating that attorney fees may be awarded against
the United States government); Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 78r(a) (1988)
(permitting attorney fees to be awarded to either party, especially if the suit or defense was without
merit); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (stating that the prevailing plaintiff shall recover
attorney's fees); Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(1) (1988) (requiring the court to award
attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff, on proper motion); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§
11705(d)(3), 11710(b), 11711(d) (1988) (mandating that the court award attorney fees to the
prevailing plaintiff); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11708(c) (1988) (stating that the court
may award attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11711 (e)
(1988) (permitting the court to award attorney fees to the defendant if the action was brought in bad

faith).
53.
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fees.5 4 The remaining civil rights statutes require the trial court to
55
grant an attorney fee award.

Federal environmental protection statutes also typically restrict
attorney fee awards to "prevailing" or "substantially prevailing"
parties." Federal environmental protection statutes can be
classified on two parameters: How much discretion the trial court
has in awarding attorney fees, and to whom the trial court can
award attorney fees. Some environmental statutes may permit the
court to grant attorney fee awards to any party.'

Other

54. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988) (permitting the
court to award reasonable attorney fees to parties who prevail in a claim of racial discrimination in
places of public accommodation); il, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5(k) (1988) (racial
discrimination in employment practices); Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1997a(b), 1997c(d) (1988) (parties residing in an institution who prevail in a claim for deprivation
of civil rights); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3610, 3612(p) (1988) (discrimination
in the sale or lease of housing on the basis of race, religion, sex, handicap, or familial status); Equal
Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412,2412(b), 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (tort
claim against the United States); Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1988) (seven types of civil rights claims: 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (equal rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1988) (property rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (deprivation of civil rights under color of state
law); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988)
(failing to act to prevent a conspiracy to deprive the parties of civil rights); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988)
(discrimination in education, or in a program receiving federal funds, on the basis of sex); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1988) (racial discrimination by recipients of federal funds)). See generally 7 B. E. WrrluN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDlTRE, Judgment § 161 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976). Congress adopted § 1988 in response to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429; see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at
249-50 (affirming the American Rule).
55. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (requiring the court to award attorney fees to
the prevailing party in a non-tort, civil case against the United States); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988)
(adversarial hearing before an administrative agency); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206,
216(b) (1988) (violations of provisions on minimum wages); Id., 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988) (maximum
work hours without compensation for overtime); id., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988) (discrimination
against employees who have filed suit for violation of fair labor standards).
56. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (examining statutes which definte "prevailing
party"). A party need not succeed on the merits of the case in order to be considered "prevailing"
for the purposes of statutory fee awards. E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AwARDs oF ATroRNEY's FEES
62-74 (1981), cited in Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, supra note 30, at 677. Under these
provisions, courts may award attorney fees to plaintiffs who obtain relief through settlements or
consent decrees, or even those who act as "catalysts" to modify defendants' behavior. Id.
57. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1533, 1534, 1538, 1540(g)(4)
(1988) (prohibitions on importing, exporting, taking, possessing, selling, carrying, transporting,
shipping, delivering, receiving, selling, offering, removing, damaging, destroying, or trading
endangered or threatened species or their components); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1411, 1415(g)(4) (1988) (prohibition against the dumping of any material
in ocean waters from vessels registered in the United States, or any vessel in United States ocean
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environmental protection statutes permit the court to award attorney
58 Finally, a few environmental
fees only when appropriate.
statutes requirethe court to grant attorney fee awards to prevailing

waters); Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1905, 1907, 1910(d) (1988)
(prohibition against discharge of oil, noxious liquid substances, or garbage from ships of United
States registry, or any ship while in the navigable waters of the United States, unless ships comply
with a certain discharge protocol).
58. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (ToSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2603(a)(2),
2604(b)(4), 2605(a), 2618(a)(1)(A), 2618(d), 2619(a)(1), 2619(c)(2) (1988) (permitting a court to
award reasonable attorney fees, if the court determines that such an award is "appropriate" to enforce
the Act's prohibitions on manufacture, distribution, processing, use or disposal of certain hazardous
substances); Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§
1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 1344, 1365(d) (1988) (suits brought by private citizens to
enforce the prohibition against discharging any pollutant in a manner not in compliance with its
mandates); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6902, 6907, 6913, 6921, 6972(e) (1988)
(suits brought by private citizens to enforce the Act, which develops guidelines, provides technical
assistance for solid waste management, and regulates hazardous waste); Clean Air Amendments of
1970 (Clean Air Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7403,7404,7407,7408, 7604(d) (1988) (suits brought by
private citizens to enforce the Act, which funds research, delegates the responsibility for assuring air
quality to each state, and establishes national air quality standards); id. § 7607(t) (person challenging
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) national emission standards); id. § 7413(b) (EPA
unreasonably brings suit against the owner or operator of a major stationary source of pollution). The
scope of the term "appropriate" as used in section 7607(0 was considered in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). There, the plaintiffs challenged emission standards set by the EPA and
lost. Ruckeshaus, 463 U.S. at 68 1. However, despite the plaintiffs' lack of success, the trial judge
awarded the plaintiffs' attorney fees. Id at 682. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. Id. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, and held that other federal fee shifting provisions reflect the
consistent rule that "[a] successful party need not pay its unsuccessful adversary's fees." Id. at 685.
The Court also noted that the legislative history of The Clean Air Act showed that the Act was not
designed to reject this rule, but merely to expand it to include partially prevailing parties. Id. at 686.
The Court held that it was inappropriate for a federal court to award attorney fees under § 7607(0,
unless the party at least partially prevailed. Id. at 694. See also Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9605(a), 9611(a),
9612(c)(3) (1988) (giving the United States President authority to request the Attorney General to
recover any costs paid out of Superfund, including attorney fees, from any person liable for the
environmental cleanup).
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parties." California fee shifting statutes can be similarly
classified. 6
2. CaliforniaFee Shifting Statutes
The California Legislature has indicated that, unless a relevant
statute specifically provides for attorney fees, the fees are left to
any agreement between the parties. 6' To date, the Legislature has
promulgated over 200 fee shifting statutes, which can be found in
almost every one of the State's codes.62
59. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 1344, 1367(c) (1988) (suits brought by employees
who are discharged in retaliation for instituting or testifying in a proceeding under the Act, which
prohibits discharging any pollutant in a manner not in compliance with its mandates); Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 (Clean Air Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7403, 7404, 7407, 7408, 7622(b)(2)(B)
(1988) (suits brought by employees who are discharged in retaliation for instituting or testifying in
a proceeding under the Act, which funds research, delegates the responsibility for assuring air quality
to each state, and establishes national air quality standards); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
6901, 6902, 6907, 6913, 6921, 6971(c) (1988) (suits brought by employees who are discharged in
retaliation for instituting or testifying in a proceeding under the Act, which develops guidelines,
provides technical assistance for solid waste management, and regulates hazardous waste).
60. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (surveying California fee shifting statutes).
61. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1993).
62. See Attorney Fees, 1984 CAL. CONTINUING EDUc. B. § 1.311, at 253-67 (listing 235
California fee shifting provisions); see, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7044, 7168 (West Supp.
1993); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 789.3(d), 798.85, 1714.1(b), 1717, 1788.30(c), 1798A6, 1798.48(b),
1798.53, 1799.2, 1811.1, 1942.5,2983.4,2988.9,3250 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE §§ 730,731.5 (West 1980 & 1987); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 43048(b) (West Supp. 1993); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 19765 (West 1980); CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 25455 (West 1986); CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE § 453 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that the court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing
party); CAL Civ. CODE §§ 815.7, 1584.5, 1584.6, 2528 (West Supp. 1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 396b, 527.6(h), 1021.5, 1021.6 (West Supp. 1993); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 865.6(e), 15153(d),
18333(e) (West 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11130.5, 54960.5, 91012 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993)
(providing that the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party); CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 10238.7, 16750(a), 17082, 21140.4 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); CAL Civ. CODE §§ 1747.50(c),
1747.60(c), 1747.70(d), 1785.31(d), 1786.50(a)(2), 1787.3, 1812.34, 1812.123(a) (West 1985); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 491.160, 1030, 1031(c), 1235.140(b), 1245.060(b) (West Supp. 1993); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 27200 (West 1977); CAL EDUC. CODE § 67139.5 (West 1989); CAL HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7109 (West 1970); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11629, 11708 (West 1988); CAL LAB. CODE
§§ 432.7(b), 3709,3709.5,3856,3860,5801 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 496,
593d (West Supp. 1993); CAL STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5412, 6615, 8831, 9354 (West 1969 & Supp.
1993); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1957 (West 1986); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10962, 19709
(West 1984 & 1991) (providing that the court shall award attorney fees to the successful plaintiff or
injuredparty); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 21202, 22386 (West 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 52(a),
54.3, 56.35, 1794, 1794.1(a), 1794.1(b), 1812.62(a), 1812.94(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); CAL.
Crv. PRoc. CODE §§ 482.110(b), 491.130,585(a) (West Supp. 1993); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1158 (West

1579

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol 24
California fee shifting statutes can be classified, like their
federal counterparts, according to how much discretion the
provision gives the trial court to award attorney fees.
Approximately sixty percent of the fee shifting statutes mandate the
award of attorney fees.63 The remaining fee shifting statutes
permit the courts to award attorney fees.'
Although both Congress and the California Legislature have
enacted a plethora of fee shifting statutes, these provisions rarely
65
explain how the court is to compute "reasonable" attorney fees.
Therefore, Congress and the California Legislature have entrusted
the task of developing methods for calculating reasonable attorney
fees to the courts." Courts developed two slightly different
methods for calculating reasonable attorney fees: The lodestar
reasonable fee model, and the Johnsontwelve factor approach. The
United States Supreme Court has adopted the lodestar model, but

Supp. 1993); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 800, 13965(c), 13973(e), 31536 OVest 1980 & Supp. 1993); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26850.5(b) (West Supp. 1993); CAL. INS. CODE § 1619 (West Supp.
1993); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4555, 4607, 4903.2, 5410.1, 5710 (West 1989); CAL PENAL CODE §
653.60 (West 1988) (providing that the court may award attorney fees to the plaintiff or injured
party).
63. See Attorney Fees, 1984 CAL. CONTNUING EDUC. B. § 1.311, at 253-67 (listing 235
California fee shifting provisions); see, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROc. CODE § 532(b) (West 1979 & Supp.
1993) (requiring a court to award attorney fees to a plaintiff who has successfully sought an
injunction to prevent the diversion of waters to be used for irrigation or domestic purposes); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1990) (requiring the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative suit to post a
bond to cover the corporation's attorney fees if the class action is unsuccessful); CAL. CIv. PROc.
CODE § 1036 (West 1980) (requiring the court in an inverse condemnation action to award attorney
fees to the prevailing plaintiff).
64. See Attorney Fees, 1984 CAL CONTINoING EDuc. B. § 1.311, at 253-67 (listing 235
California fee shifting provisions); see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(g) (West 1989) (granting the
court discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to recover wages lost due
to sex discrimination); California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 12940,
12941, 12965(b) (West 1993) (employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, handicap,
medical condition, marital status, sex, or age); U § 12955 (West 1993) (housing discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, sex ormarital status); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.4 (West Supp. 1993)
(action for damages brought by a victim against the convicted felon); id § 128.5 (West 1991 & Supp.
1993) (party has used bad faith, dilatory tactics, or brought frivolous actions).
65. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(0 (1988) (defining reasonable
attorney fees as based on the actual time the attorney spent on the case and the prevailing rate for
similar services).
66. New Fee Award Procedure, supra note 5, at 866; see infra notes 68-110 and
accompanying text (discussing the development of the lodestar model).
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realized that the lodestar can be enhanced by certain Johnson
factors.67
C. Development of Lodestar Model
1. Pre-LodestarPredicament
Aside from pro bono cases, lawyers in the United States are
generally paid either a certain fee, regardless of the suit's outcome,
or a contingent fee, which depends upon the success of the
litigation. Under either variation on the American Rule, neither the
reasonableness nor the calculation of attorney fees is generally an
issue, as the preferred method is to allow litigants and their lawyers
to determine compensation.68 The common fund doctrine6 9 was
the earliest exception to this rule, and requires spreading the costs
of suit among the beneficiaries.7" The United States Supreme
Court recognized the high value of attorneys' services in common
fund cases, and approved awarding a percentage of the fund
recovered as compensation to the attorneys.7 Under the common
fund exception, with attorney fees calculated as a percentage of the
recovery, the reasonableness of attorney fees became an issue.
Trial courts began to rely on a percentage of the common fund
recovered as the appropriate measure of attorney fees.72 Since
appellate courts did not establish guidelines for fee awards, trial
courts were free to exercise their discretion.73 Even a relatively
low percentage of a multi-million dollar recovery appears as a
windfall attorney fee award. Moreover, in determining an

67. See infra notes 76-110 and accompanying text (discussing the two different approaches,
and the adoption of the lodestar model).
68. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that "[e]xcept as

attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties
to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.").
69. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the common fund doctrine).
70. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-34 (1881).
71. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 128 (1885).
72. ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 31.

73. l
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appropriate percentage, trial courts would only refer generally to
certain considerations, and would not state specifically which
factors they considered, or what weight the courts gave to
particular factors.74 Presented with such vague records, appellate
courts had difficulty reviewing the attorney fee awards to determine
if the awards were reasonable. It was clear to appellate judges
that a uniform approach to fee shifting was necessary. The
appellate courts developed two approaches: The lodestar approach,
and the twelve factor approach.
2. Circuit Courts Adopt Two Similar Approaches
Federal circuit courts of appeals responded to the need for a
standard approach to statutory fee shifting in two slightly different
ways. In Lindy Brothers Buildersv. American Radiator& Standard
Sanitary Corp. (Lindy I),76 a shareholder derivative suit, the Third
Circuit rejected the trial courts' common practice of awarding
attorney fees as a standard percentage of the recovery in class
actions." Instead, the Third Circuit adopted a new approach: The
trial court would multiply the number of hours reasonably spent on
the case by a basic hourly rate for noncontingent work .7' The
court would thus arrive at a reasonable level of compensation,
which would be the "lodestar" of the court's fee determination.79
The court could then adjust the lodestar for the contingent nature
of success 0 and the quality of the attorney's work.81 Based on

74. 1R,
75. I, § 2.03, at 32. Apparently this is still a problem today. See, e.g., Drennan v. General
Motors Corp., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25613, at *20 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that in order for an
appellate court to review an attorney fee award, it remains important for the district court to provide
a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award).
76. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
77. Id at 166-67.
78. Id; see infra notes 152-170 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of using
a noncontingent rate in the lodestar calculation).
79. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167-68.
80. The Lindy I court described the "contingent nature of success" as "where... the attorney
has no private agreement that guarantees payment [of attorney fees] even if no recovery is obtained."
Id at 168.
81. Id
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this model, the Lindy I court subsequently affirmed the trial court's
determination that a hundred percent enhancement was warranted,
and further elaborated on what considerations a court should focus
on in determining whether the basic lodestar figure should be
enhanced.82
The Fifth Circuit developed a slightly different approach. In
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc.,83 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals set forth twelve factors for a court to consider in
setting reasonable attorney fees.84 The twelve factors are: (1) The
time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; (3) the skill necessary to properly perform the
legal services; (4) the degree to which other work of the attorney
is precluded due to accepting the present case; (5) the attorney's
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases."
The lodestar and Johnson twelve-factor approaches became the
basis for calculating attorney fee awards, and have been followed
by every federal circuit.8 6 Only the Fourth Circuit follows the
Johnson twelve-factor approach exclusively.87 The Second, Third,
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted an
approach which blends the lodestar and Johnson twelve-factor

82. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy II), 540 F.2d
102, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc). The court stated that under the rubric of contingent nature of
recovery, a court should analyze the plaintiff's burden, the risks assumed in developing the case, and
the delay in receipt of payment for services rendered. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117. Under the rubric of
quality of attorney's services, a court should consider the result obtained, and the professional
methods used in prosecuting the case. Id at 117-18.
83. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 717-19.
85. Id The House and Senate Reports on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 referred to these twelve factors. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing the!

Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976).
86. See ATrIORNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 2.05, at 35-39 (listing cases, by circuit,
which have adopted one or both of these approaches).
87. Id at 36-37.
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approaches.8" The District of Columbia, First, Sixth and Seventh
Circuits follow either a pure or modified form of the lodestar
approach. 9 With the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals applying
different approaches, the United States Supreme Court was faced
with the need to endorse one or both approaches. The Court
adopted the lodestar model, but recognized that the calculation of
reasonable attorney fees should be enhanced to reflect Johnson
factors not subsumed in the lodestar."'

3. Supreme Court Approves Lodestar Model
The United States Supreme Court approved the lodestar model
in two cases. 9 In Hensley v. Eckerhart,92 the Court attempted to
reconcile the two strands of analysis. 3 The issue in Hensley was
whether a plaintiff who only partially prevailed could recover
attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976. 9' The lodestar is the most useful starting point for
determining reasonable attorney fees, but the court may also
95
consider other Johnson factors not subsumed within the lodestar.
The Court noted that the degree of success was important in
determining reasonable attorney fees, as was the interrelated nature
of the plaintiff's successful and unsuccessful claims. 96 In Hensley,
inmates at a state hospital alleged inter alia that the treatment and

88. 1& at 35-39; see, e.g., Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1988), Moore
v. James H. Matthews & Co., 683 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting a blended lodestar and twelvefactor approach); Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69,72 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that before Hensley,
cases suggested that a reasonable attorney fee award was to be determined by reference to the
Johnson factors); id. (explaining that the Ninth Circuit adopted them in Kerr).
89. ATYORNEY FEE AWARDs, supra note 5, § 2.05, at 35-38.
90. See infra notes 91-110 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court embraced the
lodestar approach).
91. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
92. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
93. See Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 72 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (interpreting the Court's
analysis in Hensley).
94. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426; see supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976).
95. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 434 n.9.
96. Id at 440.
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conditions at the hospital were unconstitutional. 97 The district
court found constitutional violations, and determined that the
plaintiffs were prevailing parties, even though they had not
succeeded on every claim.98 The district court awarded attorney
fees to the partially prevailing plaintiffs, and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed." The United States Supreme Court
examined congressional intent, and held that the results of litigation
were relevant to the determination of reasonable attorney fees." 0
The Hensley Court noted that the lodestar approach was designed
to provide reasonable compensation to attorneys, which required
enhancing the lodestar for the results obtained, one of the Johnson
factors not subsumed in the lodestar calculation. 0 1
In Blum v. Stenson,'" the Supreme Court was faced with the
issue whether the lodestar could be adjusted to correlate with
prevailing market rates."13 Certain Johnson factors were
necessarily subsumed within the lodestar, while others were
normally, but not necessarily subsumed.'0 The Court held that
obtaining exceptional results in the litigation would justify
enhancing the lodestar. 5 Blum was a class action seeking to
enjoin the state from automatically terminating Medicaid benefits
when a recipient became ineligible for another government
assistance program."° The district court entered judgment for the
class, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.'0 7 The

97. Id at 426-27.
98. Id at 427-28. The district court held that a patient has a constitutional right to "minimally
adequate treatment." Id. at 427.
99. Id at 428-29.
100. Id at 429-37.
101. Id
102. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
103. Id at 889. A second issue present in the case was whether a nonprofit legal organization
should be paid according to their actual costs, or according to prevailing market rates, which are
typically higher. Id This issue is not relevant to the present discussion.
104. Id at 901 n.17. The "novelty and complexity of the issues" were necessarily subsumed
within the lodestar, the "quality of representation and results obtained" were not necessarily subsumed
within the lodestar. Id The Court expressly chose not to address whether the contingent nature of
recovery was subsumed. Id
105. Ik at 901.
106. IM.at 889-90.
107. Id. at 890.
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plaintiff class requested attorney fees, including a fifty percent
enhancement to the lodestar." 8 The district court awarded the
requested attorney fees to the plaintiff class, which the Second
Circuit upheld."0 The Supreme Court affirmed the use of
enhancements to the lodestar if the prevailing attorney achieved
exceptional results."0
D. Enhancement Factorsfor Lodestar
The lodestar approach was designed to fully compensate
attorneys by calculating reasonable attorney fees."' From the
inception of the lodestar approach, courts recognized that the basic
lodestar figure often needed to be enhancedto achieve a reasonable
fee." 2 Simply multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by a
reasonable number of hours can result in a fee that is unreasonably
low because the lodestar does not consider other factors."' In
order to achieve full compensation, the lodestar needs to account
for any delay in payment to the attorney, any exceptional results
14
obtained by the attorney, and the contingent nature of success.
Courts have enhanced the lodestar figure to reflect these three
5
factors."1

108. Id at 891.
109. Id
110. Id at 897. The Court noted that a number of factors are ordinarily included either in the
number of hours expended, such as the novelty and complexity of the legal issues, or in the hourly
rate, such as the quality of representation, and thus are not appropriate factors in determining whether
the lodestar requires enhancement. Id at 898-99.
111. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).
112. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy 1), 487 F.2d
161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973). These enhancements are neither bonuses nor windfalls to the attorneys
involved. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.12, 897. Contra Chatelain v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.
Supp. 209,215 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that courts have found disfavor with lodestar multipliers, and
favor awarding a percentage of the recovery, in both common fund and statutory fee shifting cases).
113. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897.
114. ATrORNEY FEE AWARDs, supra note 5, § 4.31, at 163.
115. See infra notes 116-170 and accompanying text (discussing the three enhancements to the
lodestar calculation).

1586

1993 / City of Burlington v. Dague
1. Delay in Payment

In civil rights litigation, an attorney frequently receives
compensation several years after the attorney has performed legal
services." 6 This delay in payment of attorney fees is primarily
due to the lengthy litigation process." 7 When the judicial process

delays payment of attorney fees, the attorney suffers at least three
distinct losses. 8 First, the attorney loses spending power due to
inflation, as prices have increased while the attorney was waiting
to be paid." 9 Second, the attorney loses the ability to invest the
attorney fees and receive interest. 2 Third, the attorney loses the

interest the attorney paid on debts incurred in order to keep
operating while the attorney waited for payment.' 2 ' In an effort
to ameliorate these losses, courts have developed three ways to
enhance the lodestar to compensate attorneys for delayed
payment. 2 2 Courts can either include interest on the payment of
attorney fees, 23 adjust the fee for' inflation,'24 or combine the
two in an "opportunity cost factor.9'12

116. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274,283 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II), 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987).
117. See JACK H. FRmDENHrAL, Er AL., CwVI PROCEDURE § 10.1, at 452 (1985) (noting that
many courts have up to four to five year backlogs in their trial calendars).
118. ATrORNnY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 4.35, at 166.
119. Id.
120. Id,
121. 1&d
122. Id. § 4.35, at 167.
123. Congress provided for post-judgment interest on civil judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1992).
124. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 32 Fed. R. Serv.2d (Callaghan) 1330,26 Fair EmpI. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1689,27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P32,256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1981) (holding that a fee
award should be adjusted via an inflation factor during a period of double digit inflation, rather than
by providing interest), cited in ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 4.35, at 167 n.203.
125. See Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205,1211 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
994 (1983) (explaining that court should consider interest and inflation in calculating attorney fees);
Louisville Black Police Officers Org., Inc. v. City of Louisville, 700 F.2d 268, 274 (6th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing that an adjustment for delay in payment of attorney fees was appropriate); Chapliwy v.
Uniroyal Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983) (affirming use
ofadjustment for delay in payment of attorney fees); ATrORMNn FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 4.35,
at 167 n.204 (citing cases); see also Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 322 (1986) (noting
that providing interest on damages was functionally equivalent to providing compensation for delay
in payment); Id. (recognizing that, although the government is immune from providing interest or
compensation for delay in payment, it is appropriate in non-government cases to adjust for the timing
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In Missouri v. Jenkins,26 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether an enhancement for delay in
payment is permissible. 7 Jenkins involved a class of public
school children suing the school district and State of Missouri to
desegregate their schools.'28 The students prevailed, and their
attorneys requested attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976.129 The attorneys had represented the
students in litigation lasting over five years. 3 ' The district court
awarded almost $4 million in attorney fees.' 3 ' The district court
accounted for the lengthy delay in the payment of attorney fees by
increasing the principal attorney's rate, and by using current market32
rates, rather than historical rates, for the remaining attorneys.1
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the attorney fee
33
award. 1
The Supreme Court upheld the enhancement for a delay in
payment of attorney fees. 33 The Court noted that attorney fee
awards were meant to compensate lawyers at the relevant market
rate.135 Recognizing the "time value" of money,' 36 the Court
stated that compensation received years later was not equivalent to
receiving compensation when the legal services were
performed. 137 Therefore, the Court held that the lodestar could be
enhanced for delay in payment in order to determine reasonable

of payment); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I1,
483 U.S. 711, 716, 731 (1987) (distinguishing two types of enhancements: an enhancement for the
risk of nonpayment, and an enhancement for delay in payment).
126. 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
127. id. at 281-82.
128. Id at 276-77.
129. Id at 276.
130. Id
131. Id at 277.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id at 289.
135. Id at 283.
136.

See RICHARD BREAI.EY & STEwART MYERS, PRINCIPLEs Op CopORATE FINANCE 11 (2d

ed. 1984) (defining the time value of money concept as one dollar received one year from now is
worth less than one dollar received today, since the dollar received today can be invested, making
it worth more than one dollar one year from now).
137. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 283.
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attorney fees.1 38 Increasing the lodestar for delay in payment,
however, merely accounts for one of the three enhancement factors;
the lodestar may also need to be enhanced for exceptional success
139
and the contingent risk of nonpayment.
2. Exceptional Success
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,140 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the second enhancement factor--exceptional success
obtained by the attorney. 14' The Court held that computing the
lodestar is only the first step in calculating reasonable attorney
fees. 142 The Court determined that district courts may adjust the
lodestar for certain considerations, such as the "results
obtained. ' 143 In Hensley, the plaintiff prevailed on five of six
civil rights claims.'" The Court noted that determining the
degree of success is especially important when the fee shifting
statute limits recovery to "prevailing parties." 45 The Court
interpreted the "prevailing party" language as not permitting courts
to compensate attorneys for time spent on unsuccessful claims that
are unrelated to successful claims. 146 The Court recognized that
if these claims were unrelated, the plaintiff could only recover
attorney fees for time reasonably expended on the successful
claims. 147 The Court held that if the claims were related, the

district court should focus on the overall success obtained in

138. Id at 284.
139. See infra notes 140-170 and accompanying text (discussing the two remaining
enhancement factors: exceptional success and contingent nature of recovery).
140. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
141. Id at 430; see supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (providing summary ofHensley
case).
142. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
143. Id at 430 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th
Cir. 1974)).
144. Id at 427.
145. Id at 434 (emphasis added);see supra note 4 and accompanying text (defming -prevailing

party").
146. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
147. Id at 435. However, the Court noted that having unrelated civil rights claims may be the
exception, instead of the rule. Id

1589

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol 24
relation to the hours spent on the case.14 Thus, the Court gave
the district court discretion to weigh the degree of success in
determining reasonable attorney fees.149 The Court recognized
that courts could enhance the basic lodestar figure to reflect
exceptional success. 5
After enhancing the lodestar for
exceptional results achieved by the attorney, and for any delay in
payment, the court still needs to consider an enhancement for the
contingent risk of nonpayment.'
3. Risk of Nonpayment
If compensation is contingent on prevailing, attorneys will
necessarily charge a higher rate than if compensation is certain, in
order to account for the risk of nonpayment. 52 The Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals recognized the contingent nature of
recovery to be an acceptable basis for an enhancement to the
lodestar. 153 In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II) 54 a citizen group sought to
compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to comply with the
Clean Air Act. 55 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania agreed to
implement a program for the inspection and maintenance of vehicle
emissions in counties surrounding the cities of Philadelphia and

148. Id.
149. 1& at 440.
150. 1a&at 435. In Blum v. Stenson, the Court reaffirmed that exceptional results warranted an
enhancement to the basic lodestar calculation in order to achieve a reasonable fee. Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984). The Court in Blum placed an additional requirement on the party seeking
attorney fees, or -fee-applicant" to prove that the quality of service was disproportionately high in
relation to the hourly rates charged by her attorney. Id at 899.
151. See infra notes 152-170 and accompanying text (discussing the fimal enhancement factor
for risk of nonpayment).
152. Blum, 465 U.S. at 903 (Brennan, J., concurring).
153. See, e.g., Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 611-14 (Ist Cir. 1985); Hall v.
Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 842-44 (3d Cir. 1984); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Scaly,
Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 660-62 (7th Cir. 1985); MeKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392-93
(7th Cir. 1984); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1985); Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d
1148, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 591-93 (1lth Cir. 1984)
(recognizing that the court could enhance the lodestar for the contingent risk of nonrecovery).
154. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
155. Id at 714; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Clean Air Act).
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Pittsburgh. 15 6 The district court awarded attorney fees to the
citizens' attorneys, and doubled the lodestar to account for certain
phases of the litigation which were particularly risky.'57 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the enhancement to the
15
attorney fee award. 1
In reviewing Delaware Valley II, the United States Supreme
Court did not resolve the issue of whether federal fee shifting
statutes permit the lodestar to be enhanced to reflect the risk of
nonpayment. 159 A plurality"6 of Justices determined that a
contingency enhancement is permissible where the plaintiff would
not have found an attorney without one. 6 ' The plurality limited

the enhancement to one third of the lodestar to deter attorneys from
bringing suits that were more likely to fail than succeed. 62 The
sole concurring Justice163 would allow a contingency
enhancement only when the particular legal market compensates for
contingency, and the particular fee-applicant would have had
substantial difficulties in finding an attorney without one. 1" The
66
dissent 65 would always allow a contingency enhancement.'
Thus, due to the Supreme Court's failure to reach a consensus in
Delaware Valley II, the Court did not entirely resolve the issue of

156. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 714.
157. 1a&
158. It at 715.
159. lit
160. Justice White authored the principal opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Powell and Scalia. Id. at 713.
161. Ia&at 731.
162. I1&at 730. A case with only a 50% chance of success would require a 100% enhancement
to the lodestar to achieve the same expected return of a case with a certain fee. A case with a 75%
chance of success would only require a 33% enhancement to the lodestar to achieve parity with a
certain fee. The plurality was implicitly providing a disincentive to attorneys to take cases with less
than a 75% chance of success. See infra notes 305-317 and accompanying text (explaining the
financial underpinnings of contingency enhancements).
163. Justice O'Connor concurred in part and in the judgment. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at
731.
164. I1&at 731-34.
165. Justice Blackmun authored the dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 735.
166. I1&at 735-55.
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whether a contingency enhancement to the lodestar figure is
available under federal fee shifting statutes.1 7
Five years after Delaware Valley II, the United States Supreme
Court revisited the unresolved issue of whether a contingency
enhancement to the lodestar is available.16 8 The Court, in City of
Burlington v. Dague,'69 determined that the contingency
enhancement to the lodestar is no longer available.'
II. THE CASE

In City of Burlington v. Dague,'7 ' the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the availability of a
contingency enhancement to the lodestar calculation of reasonable
attorney fees.'72 A majority of the Court in Dague held that
contingency enhancements are not permitted under either the Solid
Waste Disposal Act or the Clean Water Act.'73 In reaching its
decision, the Court expressly adopted the plurality opinion in

167. The Justices who decided Delaware Valley II, and who are still on the Supreme Court,
voted 3-3 in favor of restricting the enhancement for the contingent nature of recovery. Justices
White, Rehnquist, and Scalia concluded that a contingency enhancement should not be available.
Justices O'Connor, Blackanun, and Stevens concluded that a contingency enhancement should be

available. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 723-34.
168. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638,2639 (1992). However, this was a different
Court than the one which stalemated in Delaware Valley 11, with three new justices to help decide
the issue. COMMISSION ON mm BicENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JusTIcEs 1790-1991, 276-81 (1992). The

plurality opinion in Delaware Valley II had only lost one of its proponents to retirement; Justice
Kennedy replaced Justice Powell, who retired on the last day of the October term, 1986, the same
day that Delaware Valley II was decided. 1d; Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F.
Powel4 Jr., 101 HARv. L. REV. 395, 399 (1987); Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 711. The strong
dissent had lost two of its staunch supporters; Justices Souter and Thomas replaced Justices Brennan
and Marshall respectively. COMMISSION ON THE BIcENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JUSTICES

1790-1991, 276-81 (1992).
169. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
170. See infra notes 171-244 and accompanying text (discussing the Dague decision).
171. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
172. Id at 2640.
173. Id at 2643-44; see 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988); supra notes 58-59
and accompanying text (discussing the Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Clean Water Act).
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Delaware Valley II,
approach.174

and expressly

rejected

the dissent's

A. The FactualHistory
The City of Burlington, Vermont owned and operated a landfill
since the early 1960's.175 In part of the landfill, trash was beneath
the water table. 176 Ernest Dague, Sr. owned property adjacent to
the landfill. 177 The landfill was also bounded by a wetland and
pond, which occasionally flooded and covered parts of the landfill
with water.7 7 Due to this occasional flooding, and the fact that
trash in the landfill was buried beneath the water table,
groundwater mixed with, and flowed through contaminated waste
in the landfill.1 79 The liquid that was formed by the mixture of
water and garbage was called "leachate," which contained
chemicals found on federal toxic and hazardous lists. 18 0 The
leachate entered the groundwater and killed small fish as well as
water flora and fauna.''
The State of Vermont began to scrutinize the landfill in the

early 1980's.'

The State and City entered into an agreement to

close the landfill by July, 1984.183 The City's non-compliance

174. Dague, 112 S.Ct. at 2643-44; see infra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the
dissenting opinion in Delaware Valley II).
175. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1347 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, City of
Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). The landfill covered an I1 acre, rectangular parcel
north of the commercial-residential center of the City of Burlington. id.
176. Id. On the northern edge of the landfill, which was the portion furthest away from the City
of Burlington, trash was buried nine feet below the water table. IdL
177. I& Plaintiffs, including Mr. Dague, owned property east and south of the landfill. I&a
178. Id. The wetland and pond were located to the west of the landfill. Id. The wetland
comprised the flood plain of a nearby river. IM.
179. Id. The contaminants in the garbage had originated from local industries. I&a
180. k. The leachate had percolated through solid waste in the landfill, much as coffee
percolates through coffee grounds. ki.
181. Id. The leachate was free to enter the groundwater beneath the landfill, because the landfill
was not lined with a waterproof or water-resistant layer. Ic.The fact that the leachate killed a species
of fish known as the "fathead minnow" showed that the leachate was dangerous to vertebrates. Id.
This proved that the leachate was dangerous to humans, who are also vertebrates. DoRLAND's
ILLusTRATED MEDIcAL DICTIONARY 1452 (26th ed. 1985).

182.
183.

Dague, 935 F.2d at 1348.
Id.
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with the agreement resulted in the State and City amending the
terms of the agreement several times.184 This series of
amendments culminated in an agreement under which the City was
to install a leachate collection system."8 5 This final agreement
also gave the City the option to either relocate the landfill, or begin
operating a recycling facility, and delay closing the landfill by two
86
years.
After the City of Burlington again failed to comply with the
terms of the amended agreement, Mr. Dague and other nearby
-landowners hired attorneys on a contingent fee basis to bring
suit.8 7 They sought to force the city to close the landfill.'88 The
State of Vermont concurrently brought an action to enforce the
amended agreement.8 9
Dague's complaint alleged that the landfill had harmed the
environment generally, and damaged the surrounding property
specifically, because the landfill generated methane gas, windblown debris and hazardous waste. 9 ' The State of Vermont
continued to perform environmental assessments of the landfill, 9 '

184. lit
185. Id
186. Id. The first option required closing the landfill by January 1, 1988. Rd The second option,
to begin operating a recycling or "resource recovery" facility, extended the date to close the landfill
to January 1, 1990. Id
187. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2640. The City failed to install either a leachate control or methane
gas control system, and also failed to properly notify the State of which option the City had chosen,
Dague, 935 F.2d at 1348. The City of Burlington's board of aldermen did adopt a resolution to
pursue the second option, to operate a recycling facility, but the mayor vetoed the resolution. Id,
188. I Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which would have required the City of
Burlington to close the landfill. Id The federal Magistrate recommended that the district court deny
the injunction, but require the City to institute remedial measures. Id The district court adopted the
Magistrate's recommendation, and ordered the City to install both a leachate collection system and
a methane gas ventilation system within sixty days. Id It was only in response to this federal court
order that the City complied, and installed the two systems, Id
189. Id
190. Id at 1346. The complaint sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, compensatory and
punitive damages, costs and attorney fees. Id Mr. Dague also sought an enhancement to the lodestar
to reflect the contingent nature of recovery. Id
191. Id at 1348.
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concluding that the landfill must be closed by 1990 due to the
environmental concerns the landfill presented.' 92
B. The ProceduralHistory
The district court found that the City had operated the landfill
in violation of prohibitions against open dumping, that the landfill
may have presented an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or the environment, and that the landfill had
discharged pollutants into United States waters. 93 The district
court ruled that the City of Burlington violated the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (SWDA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA), and
ordered the city to close the landfill.'94 The court also determined
"' and was
that Mr. Dague was a substantially prevailing party, 95
therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Acts.'
The district court used the lodestar method to determine
reasonable attorney fees. 97 In calculating the lodestar, the court
found that the attorneys' hourly rates and number of hours
expended were reasonable.' 98 The district court held that a
contingency enhancement would be appropriate if competent
counsel might refuse to represent environmental clients without an
enhancement, thereby denying non-affluent, environmental
plaintiffs effective access to the courts."'
The district court stated that Mr. Dague's risk of not prevailing
in his environmental claims against the City was substantial. 2°

192. l. The State concluded that the landfill did not pose any immediate danger to either
human health or to the environment, but that the landfill did pose long-term environmental concerns.
Id
193. k at 1346-49.
194. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. C. 2638, 2640 (1992); see supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text (discussing the SWDA and CWA).
195. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement in many
environmental protection statutes that a party prevail before the court awards them attorney fees).
196. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2640.
197. Id
198. Id.
199. Id (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir.
1987)).
200. Id

1595

Pacific Law JournalI
Vol 24
The court also noted that without an enhancement, Dague would
have faced substantial difficulty in obtaining counsel of reasonable
skill and competence.2"' As a result, a twenty-five percent
enhancement of the lodestar was deemed appropriate. 2 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed," 3 and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari."
C. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court held that, under the SWDA and the CWA,
the lodestar cannot be enhanced for the contingent nature of
recovery." 5 The Court in Dague expressly restricted its decision
to contingency enhancements under the SWDA and the CWA. 206
Nevertheless, the Court also noted in dicta that the language in the
two statutes is similar to many other federal fee shifting statutes,
and that the case law construing what is a reasonable fee applies
uniformly to all of the federal fee shifting statutes.20 7
The majority reviewed the Supreme Court's plurality opinion
in Delaware Valley 11.20' The majority noted that the SWDA and

201. Id.
202. IM
203. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1359-60 (2d Cir.), rev'd, City of Burlington
v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
availability of an enhancement to the lodestar figure for the contingent nature of recovery was an
open question among the circuit courts of appeals. Id The Second Circuit expressly disagreed with
the position taken by some circuits that Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Delaware Valley
II was controlling. Ma; see infra notes 232, 280-285 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Delaware Valley 11).
204. See infra notes 205-223 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion by the
Supreme Court).
205. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638,2643-44 (1992). Daguewas a 6-3 opinion,
with Justices O'Connor, Blackmun and Stevens continuing their strong dissents from DelawareValley
II. The three new members of the Court, Justices Kennedy, Souter and Thomas, lined up with Chief

Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and White, who had formed the nexus of the plurality opinion
in Delaware Valley HI.
206. Id
207. Id at 2641; see infra notes 321-323 and accompanying text (exploring the ramifications
of these two seemingly inapposite statements).
208. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2640 (reviewing DelawareValley 11, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)); see supra
notes 154-167 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware Valley I1 opinion).
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CWA were similar to many other federal fee shifting statutes."9

The SWDA and CWA provided for the non-prevailing party to pay
the reasonable attorney fees of the prevailing party.210 The
majority noted that the lodestar approach has "become the guiding
light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence," and that there is a strong
presumption that the lodestar represents reasonable attorney
fees.

2 11

The majority stated four reasons for not permitting a
contingency enhancement to the lodestar. First, a contingency
enhancement would duplicate factors already included in the
lodestar calculation.21 2 The lodestar already reflects the difficulty
of proving the merits either through the higher number of hours the
attorney expended in proving a difficult claim, or in the higher
hourly rate of an attorney skilled enough to prosecute the difficult

209. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)).
212. Id. The majority defined the risk of loss in a particular case as the "product" of the legal
and factual merits of the claim, and the attorney's difficulty in establishing those merits at trial. Id,
The majority stated that the lodestar should not reflect the merits of the claim, since some weakness
in the merits would always exist, and thus the lodestar would always have to be enhanced. IM The
majority concluded that enhancing the lodestar to account for the relative merits of the case would
provide the same incentive for attorneys to bring relatively meritless claims as it would to bring
relatively meritoriousclaims. Id. at 2641-42. The majority provided an example: a meritless claim
with an underlying merit (i.e. probability of success) of only 20%, and a meritorious claim with a
merit of 80%. Id at 2642. Without a contingency enhancement, an attorney paid on a contingency
fee basis, would prefer to take the meritorious claim, since the attorney would be four times more
likely to be paid. Id The majority stated that with a contingency enhancement, this preference would
disappear. Id The enhancement for the 20% claim would be a multiplier of five (= 100/20) which
would be quadruple the 1.25 multiplier (100/80) that would attach to the 80% claim. Id Thus, if an
attorney spent ten hours working on each case, and the appropriate billing rate was $100, the attorney
would hope to earn $1,000. Id Without a contingency enhancement, the attorney's expected fee
would be $800 (= 80% x $1,000) for the meritorious claim, and only $200 (- 20% x $1,000) for the
meritless claim. Id; see infra note 305 (explaining the "expected return" concept). With a
contingency enhancement, the attorney's expected fee would be $1,000 for both the meritorious claim
(= 80% x 1.25 x $1,000) and the meritless claim (= 20% x 5 x $1,000). Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642.
The majority also stated that the difficulty of establishing the merits of a case should not be the basis
for a contingency enhancement. Id. at 2641.
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case.2" 3 Accounting for it again by enhancing the lodestar figure
would be double-counting.2"'
Second, the majority held that a contingency enhancement is
inappropriate because it compensates plaintiffs for the risk of losing
the case. 215 Just as fee shifting statutes bar non-prevailing
plaintiffs from recovering, the statutes should also bar the plaintiff
from recovering for the risk of not prevailing. 2 6 Thus, the
majority concluded that awarding a contingency enhancement pays
for an attorney's time spent on other cases where the client did not
217
prevail.
Third, the majority was concerned that courts would only use
the contingency enhancement to increase, but not to decrease the
fee award. 2 " The Supreme Court has generally favored the
lodestar model over the contingent fee model.219 The majority
stated that to attach a contingent fee enhancement onto the lodestar
calculation creates a hybrid scheme, to which courts would only
resort to increase attorney fees.220
Fourth, the majority claimed that contingency enhancements
make a court's determination of fees more complex and
" '
arbitrary.22
Thus, the determination would be more
unpredictable, leading to increased litigation. 222 For all of these
reasons, the majority concluded that a contingency enhancement is
223
not permitted under the SWDA and CWA.

213. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,898-99 (1984)); see also
MODEL RULES oF PRoF ssioNAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2 cmt. 5 (noting that major litigation and complex

transactions usually require greater attention and preparation than matters of lesser consequence).
214. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 (citing Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. 711, 726-27 (1987)).
215. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The majority was concluding that contingency enhancements could only be used to
increase the lodestar for above-average risk (e.g. 125% of the lodestar), but not to decrease the

lodestar for below-average risk (e.g. 75% of the lodestar).
219. Id. at 2643.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. lId.
223. Id at 2643-44. The Court expressly adopted Justice White's opinion in Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley 11), 483 U.S. 711,715-27 (1987).
Id
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D. The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Blacknun
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, arguing
that the majority's decision would hurt those plaintiffs who could
neither afford to pay their attorneys a certain fee nor attract
competent counsel with a contingent fee, because it prevented
attorneys from being fully compensated.224 The dissent believed
that an enhanced fee was appropriate in Dague, based on two basic,
underlying principles. 5 First, a reasonable fee must be fully
compensatory, and based on prevalent rates in the relevant
market.22 6 Second, a lawyer paid on a contingency basis will tend
to charge a higher fee.2 27
Justice Blackmun explained that, by not permitting a reasonable
enhanced fee, Dague will weaken enforcement of the statutes
where Congress authorized fee shifting, most importantly, many of
our civil rights and environmental statutes.22 Fee shifting
litigation will become less remunerative than other types of
litigation, where attorneys can charge higher rates to account for
the risk of nonpayment.229 A majority of attorneys will not take
the less rewarding fee shifting cases, and only under-employed and
public interest lawyers will prosecute such cases.230

224. Id. at 2645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2644 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
226. IU.
227. Id. Professional standards have recognized this practice as reasonable. Id If an attorney
has the option to take two cases which would require the same amount of time, and the first client
can afford to pay a certain fee while the second client can only offer a contingent fee, in order to

make the attorney indifferent between the two cases, even if the contingent fee case has more merit,
the compensation in the contingent fee case would have to be higher. Xa. A contingency enhancement
compensates the attorney for the risk the attorney has taken by prosecuting the contingent fee case.
Id Thus, the majority refused to draw the only plausible conclusion. Id A statutory fee which is

consistent with market practices must be reasonable by definition. Id Since an attorney in the private
market expects additional compensation for assuming the risk of nonpayment, a reasonable statutory
fee should also include additional compensation for contingency. Id
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2644-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that under-employed
attorneys are arguably less competent, and that there is an insufficient number of public interest
lawyers to prosecute the volume of fee shifting cases. Id.
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The dissenters argued that the majority opinion deviated from
both Supreme Court precedent and congressional intent. 31 In
Delaware Valley II, five Justices concluded that reasonable attorney
fees could include compensation above the basic hourly rate, yet
the Dague court held otherwise.2 32 Congress intended for courts
to enhance the lodestar, yet the Dague Court interpreted
congressional intent differently.233
Moreover, none of the Court's arguments against a contingency
enhancement were persuasive, according to the dissent.234 The
dissent argued that the majority capitalized on two meanings of the
word "contingency," when it stated that the Supreme Court has
turned away from the contingent fee to the lodestar model: A
contingency fee, which is a percentage of the damages award,
versus an attorney's fee being contingent on prevailing. 235 The
majority's concern about "burdensome satellite litigation '2 36 was

231. AL at 2645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232. Id (citing Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)). Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens would always allow a contingency enhancement, unless the attorney and client
have mitigated the risk of nonpayment through some other method. Id.Justice O'Connor would allow
a contingency enhancement when the particular market compensates for contingency, and the
particular fee-applicant can prove that the applicant would have had significant difficulties in finding
counsel. IR at 2646 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Artis v. United States Indus. and Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 805 F. Supp. 609, 610 (N.D. 111. 1992) (noting that
conventional wisdom after Delaware Valley 11 was that Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was
controlling because it was the fifth
vote necessary for the judgment); Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp.
69, 73 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that the Ninth Circuit concluded that Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Delaware Valley II became the law, but that the Second Circuit disagreed).
233. Dague, 112 S.Ct. at 2645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In enacting fee shifting legislation,
Congress knew how to prohibit enhancements if it had wanted. kL at 2645 n.4 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). A number of bills which would have prohibited enhancements failed to get a majority
vote in Congress. Id Also, Congress expressly prohibited enhancements to the lodestar under certain
statutes. Id
234. Id at 2646 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)..For example, the majority's first argument was that
a contingency enhancement would allow an attorney to recover fees for cases in which the client had
lost, and thus the fee award would be excessive. Id In response, the dissent explained that fee
shifting provisions generally award attorney fees to prevailing parties, not directly to the attorneys.
Id
235. Id The dissent explained that the prevailing party did not intend to give a portion of the
damages award to the attorney, as is typical under a contingent fee arrangement (first meaning of
"contingent"), but rather, that the lodestar should be enhanced to reflect the contingent risk of
nonpayment (second meaning of "contingent"). Id at 2646-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236. Id at 2643. The majority was concerned that after the case had been decided on the
merits, there would be a second trial on the issue of attorney fees. At
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misguided, since courts would quickly settle on appropriate
enhancement percentages for different types of litigation.237 The
majority was also concerned that any approach which treats cases
as a class would not work, because there is no relevant market for
cases seeking only equitable relief and because attorneys only
respond to the riskiness of the particular case involved.23 Yet
under the unenhanced lodestar, the trial court already must find a
relevant private market from which to select a reasonable fee, and
the majority's objection also assumes that the only relevant
incentive for attorneys is the risk of losing."'
E. The Dissenting Opinion by Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor dissented separately to explain that reasonable
attorney fees must provide an incentive to a lawyer deciding
whether or not to take the case.240 Justice O'Connor explained
that, unless a contingent client can promise an enhancement to the
basic lodestar amount which is sufficient to justify the risk of
nonpayment, the attorney will take another case with a certain fee,
even if the other case has less merit.241 Reiterating her position
in Delaware Valley II, Justice O'Connor argued that the
enhancement should be based on how the market compensates
contingent fee cases as a class, rather than on the assessment of the
risk involved in any particular case. 242 Justice O'Connor
recognized that although courts making enhancement

237. Id at 2647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see infra notes 280-285 and accompanying text
(explaining Justice O'Connor's approach). Moreover, the dissent believed that the argument that
enhancement determinations would be burdensome missed the point, since the issue was whether they
are required by fee shifting statutes. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239. Id Justice Blackinun explained that enhancements would address the incentive common
to all lawyers to avoid claims where the plaintiff cannot guarantee compensation if the attorney does
not prevail. Id. The dissenters noted that, without an enhancement, even the least meritorious claim
with guaranteed compensation, will be preferable to the most meritorious fee shifting claim with
compensation only if the attorney prevails. Id.; see infra notes 305-317 and accompanying text
(discussing the financial justifications for a contingency enhancement to the lodestar figure).
240. Dague, 112 S. CL at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. Id
242. Id
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determinations for different types of cases would be performing
economic calculations with less than perfect data, the Court had
never shied away from performing such calculations merely

because the task was difficult or the result was potentially
inaccurate.243 Moreover, Justice O'Connor argued that courts
would overcome the initial hurdles inherent in her approach as the
enhancement rates appropriate for different kinds of litigation
would quickly become settled. 2'
Il. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

Of the three possible enhancements to the lodestar--for delay in
payment, exceptional results, and the contingent nature of recovery-the United States Supreme Court in City of Burlington v. Dague
removed the most powerful.245 Before the Supreme Court
eliminated contingency enhancements in Dague, environmental and

243. Id, Justice O'Connor listed inverse condemnation and antitrust cases as examples of
similar economic calculations with imperfect data. ld.
244. Il The majority found two problems with Justice O'Counor's approach. L at 2642. First,
Justice O'Connor's approach placed conflicting demands on a prevailing party, who would have to
prove not only that they would have had difficulty finding an attorney without a contingency
enhancement because of the riskiness of their case, but also that attorneys did not want to take their
case because of the riskiness of the class of cases as a whole. Id. Second, Justice O'Connor's
approach treated cases as a class in determining the appropriateness of a contingency enhancement,
and for those contingent-fee claimants seeking equitable relief, there is no private, contingent-fee
market to define fully compensatory attorney fees. Id Moreover, enhancing a lodestar based on the
riskiness of the class as a whole, would mean that only those cases with the class-average chance of
success would have their attorneys compensated appropriately. Id Those attorneys whose cases have
an above-average chance of success would be overcompensated. Id Of course, the majority failed
to note that under their model, those attorneys whose cases have a below-average chance of success
would be undercompensated.
245. ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 1.10, at 17. The Court has indicated that only
truly extraordinaryresults will provide the basis for an enhancement to the lodestar for the results
obtained. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897
(1984); seesupranotes 140-151 and accompanying text (discussing the enhancement for exceptional
results). The vast majority of attorneys will be unable to prove that the results obtained in their case
were exceptional, and thus an enhancement to the lodestar for the results obtained will generally not
be available. The Supreme Court has also held that an enhancement to the lodestar for a delay in
payment of the attorney fees may be appropriate when necessary to compute reasonable attorney fees.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274,284 (1989). However, some delay in litigation is typical, and an
attorney would probably have to argue an unreasonablylong delay in payment of attorney fees in
order to have the lodestar enhanced for this factor. See supra note 117 and accompanying text
(discussing how the litigation process may be protracted).
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civil rights attorneys relied on contingency enhancements to equate
attorney fees under fee shifting statutes with more certain fees.246
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Dague has already begun
to have ripple effects among environmental and civil rights
attorneys and cases. 24 7
The reasoning in Dague is convoluted,248 and conflicts with
valid economic or financial theory, which recognizes that attorneys
consider the inherent risk when deciding which case to
prosecute.249 Thus, the Court's decision will add confusion to fee
shifting jurisprudence." 0 While the Supreme Court specifically
held that contingency enhancements to the lodestar are unavailable
under the SWDA and CWA,25' the Court's reasoning would seem
to apply to contingency enhancements under all fee shifting
statutes.2 2 In fact, lower courts have already begun to interpret
the Dague decision broadly." 3 The resulting confusion in
interpretation of fee shifting statutes, should serve as a catalyst for
Congress to reassess and revamp fee shifting provisions, in order
to provide more fully compensatory, and more certain attorney
4
fees.2

246. See infra notes 305-317 and accompanying text (discussing how contingency
enhancements to the lodestar bring attorney fee awards in equipoise with cases with more certain

fees).
247. See infta notes 330-343 and accompanying text (discussing the cases which have already
begun to interpret Dague broadly).
248. See infra notes 258-289 and accompanying text (discussing the confused reasoning in
Dague).
249. See infra notes 290-317 and accompanying text (discussing the economic and financial
theoretical underpinnings of contingency enhancements to the lodestar).
250. See infra notes 318-329 and accompanying text (discussing how the Dague decision will
lead to confusion in fee shifting jurisprudence).
251. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
252. See infra notes 344-396 and accompanying text (discussing how to limit the Dague
holding).
253. See infra notes 330-343 and accompanying text (discussing the subsequent interpretation
of Dague).
254. See infra notes 397-413 and accompanying text (discussing the potential congressional
response to Dague).
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A. Criticism of the Majority Holding in Dague
The Supreme Court's reasoning in the Dague opinion is
obfuscating." Moreover, the logic of the Dague decision runs
counter to established economic 6 and financial theories.257
1. Faulty Reasoning of Dague
There are at least five weaknesses in the Dague Court's
analysis of why a contingency enhancement to the lodestar should
not be available. First, the Court assumes that a contingency
enhancement pays an attorney for unsuccessful cases." Second,
the Court finds that contingency enhancements encourage attorneys
to bring evil, speculative litigation."' 9 Third, the Court
rationalizes how it has chosen the lodestar model over the
contingent fee model. 2" Fourth, the Court asserts that allowing
contingency enhancements leads to increased complexity and
arbitrary fee award determinations. 26 1 Finally, the Court unfairly
62
attacks Justice O'Connor's alternative approach as unworkable.
The first example of the Court's faulty reasoning in Dague is
the conclusion that awarding a contingency enhancement pays for
an attorney's time spent on cases in which the client did not
prevail.263 Just as fee shifting statutes bar a plaintiff from

255. See infra notes 258-289 and accompanying text (examining the inherent conflicts in the
Dague decision).
256. See infra notes 290-304 and accompanying text (explaining how economic theory supports
contingency enhancements).
257. See infra notes 305-317 and accompanying text (explaining how financial theory supports
contingency enhancements).
258. See infra notes 263-269 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court comes to the
startling conclusion that a contingency enhancement pays attorneys for cases in which they have lost).
259. See infra notes 270-274 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's bias against
speculative litigation).
260. See infra notes 275-276 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's semantic games).

261.

See infra notes 277-279 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reasoning).

262.

See infra notes 280-285 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's attempt to discredit

Justice O'Connor's seemingly rational approach).
263.
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recovering attorney fees spent on unsuccessful claims,22645
plaintiffs should not be entitled to recover for the risk of loss.
The Court empirically noted that contingency-fee attorneys pool

their risk, and successful cases pay for unsuccessful ones.266 To
award a contingency enhancement would, in effect, pay an attorney
for time spent on unsuccessful cases.267 This is a specious
argument, which confuses the two meanings of the word
"contingency." 268 The enhancement merely increases the
attorney's basic hourly rate, used to calculate the lodestar, to equal
what the attorney effectively would have charged on a contingency
basis.269
The second flaw in logic in the Dague decision is the Court's
implicit assertion that there is no merit in attorneys bringing
speculative litigation.270 However, speculative litigation often
advances unique legal theories or new causes of action. 7' In this
respect, speculative litigation is the hallmark of the entrepreneurial
spirit of the American Bar.272 An attorney can lawfully file a
pleading which argues for the "extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law" and not be subject to civil sanctions.273
Moreover, the unadorned lodestar model may actually deter

264. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's interpretation of
congressional intent in Hensley to this effect).
265. Dague, 112 S.CL at 2643.
266. Idi
267. Ie
268. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text (discussing the semantic gyrations in the
Court's use of the word "contingency").
269. For example, if an attorney's basic hourly rate is $100 per hour, and the attorney would
ordinarily charge the equivalent of$125 per hour for a contingency fee case with an 80% probability
of winning (e.g. a contingency fee contract for 113 of a $75,000 expected award for 200 hours of
work: 113 x $75,000 = $25,000 + 200 hours = $125 effective contingent hourly rate), then a 25%
enhancement to the attorney's $100 basic rate would merely equate the rate with the effective
contingent rate the attorney would have charged in order to take the case. The proper analysis is to
consider an attorney's marginal rate of return or "opportunity cost," which is what another client is
willing to pay the attorney.
270. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.
271. The English Rule, supra note 3, at 57.
272. Id
273. FED. R. CV. PROC. 11.
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attorneys from representing clients with meritorious,not speculative
claims.274
The Dague Court's third mistake in reasoning is its bald
assertion that the Court has favored the lodestar model over the
contingent fee model.275 The Court is again playing semantic
games because fee-award practice is, by definition, "contingent."
Attorneys operating under fee shifting statutes get paid, if at all,
only when the court awards fees, after the attorneys have already
obtained successful results.276
The fourth lapse in the Court's logic is the determination that
contingency enhancements would make setting fees more complex
and arbitrary, and therefore more unpredictable and more
litigable. 77 Yet lawyers already object to the lodestar model, due

to the difficulty in predicting and collecting fees.278 Moreover,
Justice O'Connor's alternative approach to awarding contingency
enhancements would not be more complex, because courts would
quickly set appropriate enhancement factors for different types of
cases. 27 9 Furthermore, the lodestar model itself is arbitrary, since
it relies on a district court judge's perception of what is a
"reasonable" number of hours expended on the case, as well as
what is a "reasonable" local rate.
Finally, the Court in Dague attacks Justice O'Connor's
approach without warrant, as placing conflicting demands on
prevailing parties. 2 0 The Court stated that under Justice
O'Connor's approach, prevailing parties would first have to prove
that they would have had difficulty finding an attorney without a
contingency enhancement due to the riskiness of their case, and

274. New Fee Award Procedure,supra note 5, at 870.
275. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.
276. See ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 1.02, at 3.
277. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643. However, even under the English Rule, viewed as an
alternative to the lodestar, significant litigation over fee shifting is inevitable. The English Rule, supra
note 3, at 58.
278. New Fee Award Procedure,supra note 5, at 870.
279. Once courts had settled on a 25% enhancement as being appropriate in civil rights cases,
for example, this would actually tend to reduce litigation on attorney fees. See infra notes 280-85 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's approach).
280. Dague, 112 S.Ct at 2642.
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second that attorneys did not want to take their case because of the
riskiness of the class as a whole.281 The Court's argument misses
the mark. Justice O'Connor's approach first requires that the
prevailing party prove that, without a contingency enhancement, the
prevailing party would have faced substantial difficulties in finding
counsel.28 2 Ostensibly, this requirement would prevent an
enhancement from becoming a windfall to a client who had no
difficulty in locating competent counsel. The second step in Justice
O'Connor's approach requires a court to provide a risk
enhancement based on the market's need for risk
compensation. 21' This requirement prevents widely divergent
compensation for risk between federal circuits. 28' Thus, though
these two steps in Justice O'Connor's approach have different goals
in mind, they do not "collide" as Justice Scalia's questionable logic
in the majority opinion in Dague would have us believe.8 5
Regardless of whether the lodestar model or contingency
enhancements will lead to increased litigation,286 it is apparent
that the Supreme Court's decision in Dague has created more
unresolved issues than the Court resolved. Unsettled law leads to
increased litigation, which merely adds to the problem of our

overburdened court system.2" Adding complexity to the law may
be worthwhile if a decision rests on sound legal and empirical
footing. However, the Court's decision in Dague does not rest on

281. Id.
282. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II),
483 U.S. 711, 733 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
However, Justice O'Connor was agreeing with the plurality, of which Justice Scalia (who wrote the
majority opinion in Dague) was a member, that this should be a requirement. l at 731.
283. Ra at 733.
284. Id
285. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642.
286. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (comparing the Court's observations with
other commentators').
287. Michael Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, andFairnessin the
Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CoRNELt L. REV. 207, 235 (1984) [hereinafter From Here to
Attorney's Fees].
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legal precedent, but rather conflicts with existing economic288 and
financial theories.289
2. Dague Not Based on Sound Economic Theory
There are two theories underlying a contingency enhancement
to the lodestar: An economic theory and a financial theory. The
economic theory suggests that attorneys choose the cases in which
they will invest their time based on how the attorneys are
compensated." 9 The financial theory states that a rational
attorney will demand a higher return for the higher risk involved
in contingent fee cases.2 91 The Court's decision in Dague ignores
both of these theories. Thus, although the Court ignores how an
attorney selects cases, Dague will undoubtedly affect how an
attorney selects cases by making fee shifting cases less
remunerative, and therefore less attractive than other cases.2 92
The economic theory is based on the relationship between the
demand for a good or service, and the supply of that good or
service.29
If clients can obtain the same level of
representation 294 at $100 per hour from one attorney and $200
per hour from a second, equally qualified attorney, rational clients

288. See infra notes 290-304 and accompanying text (discussing the economic underpinnings
of contingency enhancements).
289. See infra notes 305-17 and accompanying text (discussing the financial underpinnings of
contingency enhancements).
290. Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1986); ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note
5, § 1.07, at 11.
291. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 448-49 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)

("The difference [between contingent and non-contingent rates] reflects the time-value of money and
the risk of nonrecovery usually borne by clients in cases where lawyers are paid an hourly rate,");
infra notes 305-17 and accompanying text (discussing the fimancial theory underlying contingency
enhancements).
292. See infra notes 303-4, 315-17 and accompanying text (discussing how attorneys will
modify their decision-making regarding which cases to take, based on the Court's decision in Dague).
293. See generallyEcONOMIC ANALYsis, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 3-9; EDGAR K. BROWNING&
JACQumENs M. BROWNING, MICRoEcoNoMIc THEORY AND APPuCATIONS 15 (1983) [hereinafter
MiCROECONOMIC THEORY] (explaining basic economic principles).
294. Economic analysis relies on having a fungible good or service. ECONoMIc ANALYSIS,
supranote 3, § 1.1, at 3-9; MICRoEcONoMIC THEORY, supra note 293, at 85. Economic theory allows
for variation in the quality of the good or service, here the quality of legal representation, by
essentially separating the different types into different markets. let
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will choose the attorney with the lower rate.295 This inverse
relationship, between the price of a service and the quantity of
services desired, can be represented by an downward sloping
demand curve, with clients demanding fewer services at higher
rates.296 Attorneys, as rational297 suppliers of legal services,
would also seek to maximize their wealth, and would be willing to
supply more legal services at $200 per hour than at $100 per

295.

Economic theory relies on the basic principle that rational people seek to maximize their

utility. See generally ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 3-9; MICROECoNOMIC THEORY,
supranote 293, at 52. Utility can be expressed in terms of happiness, or in terms of monetary wealth.
leL
296. Graphically, this would be represented as follows: Price is represented on the Y-axis, and
quantity of services on the X-axis. The Demand curve is downward sloping, because as the price
decreases, the number of litigants willing to pay that price for legal services increases.

\\

Demand

Quantity
See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 4; MIcROECONOMIc THEORY, supra note 293, at
9.
297. See supranote 295 and accompanying text (discussing how economic theory is based on
the principle that rational people seek to maximize their wealth).
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hour.298 This can be represented by an upward sloping supply
curve, with attorneys offering more services at higher rates.2
The contingent fee services supplied by attorneys are at
equilibrium with those services demanded by litigants at the price

298. See generally ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 3-9; MICROECONOMIC
TIORY, supra note 293, at 12.
299. Graphically, this would be represented as follows: Price is represented on the Y-axis, and
quantity of services on the X-axis. The Supply curve is upward sloping, because as the price
increases,the number of attorneys willing to provide legal services at that price increases.

Price

supply

Quantity
See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 8; MICROECONOMIc THEORY, supra note 293, at
13.
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set in the competitive market.3"° The demand for legal services
by plaintiffs would exceed the supply of those services if courts
restrain attorney fees below the market rate.3"' The market for

300. See generally ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 3-9. Graphically, this would
be represented as follows: Price is represented on the Y-axis, and quantity of services on the X-axis.
Where the demand for legal services equals the supply of legal services, the two curves meet, and
the market is at equilibrium.

SSupply

SDemand

Quantity
See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 8; MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 293, at
15; Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 76 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that the hourly rates lawyers
charge in competitive markets are based on the market for legal services, legal specialty, character
of law firm, and type of clients it serves).
301. See generally ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 3-9; MICROEcONOMIC
THEORY, supra note 293, at 22 (explaining basic economic theory). The rate for contingent fee legal
services is constrained below the market price if no contingency enhancement to the lodestar is
possible.
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contingent fee legal services would be out of equilibrium, and as
a result, there would be more litigants seeking legal assistance than
attorneys willing to help them. 3°2
Dague has knocked the legal market for fee shifting services
out of equilibrium. The contingency enhancement equated statutory
attorney fee awards with attorney fees set in the private market for
legal services." 3 By removing the possibility of a contingency
enhancement, Dague has constrained attorney fees below the
market rate. Attorneys are more likely to choose more remunerative
cases than those under fee shifting statutes, which can only offer
the unadorned lodestar calculation of attorney fees. There will be
more litigants with fee shifting claims seeking legal assistance than
attorneys willing to help these litigants. Dague has affected an
attorney's decision-making process, not only by ignoring economic
theory, but by ignoring financial theory as well.3°

302.

Graphically, this would be represented as follows: Price is represented on the Y-axis, and

quantity of services on the X-axis. The Price Constraint line intersects the Supply and Demand curves
at different points. By paying ess than the equilibrium price, more legal services are demanded than
attorneys are willing to provide at that price. The market is out of equilibrium, and some litigants do
not get legal services.

Supply
Pike
cuntraint

Demand
Quantity

See ECONOMIC ANALYsis, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 8; MicocoNomic THEORY, supra note 293, at
22.
303. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text (discussing how a contingency
enhancement brought the lodestar figure more in line with attorney fees paid in the legal market).
304. See infra notes 305-17 and accompanying text (discussing the financial theory behind
contingency enhancements).
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3. Dague Not Based on Sound FinancialTheory
Under the financial theory, attorneys who work on a contingent
fee basis must charge a higher fee than those who are paid a
certain fee in order to compensate for the risk of delay in payment
and the risk of nonpayment.0 5 Despite the majority opinion in
Dague, this higher fee does not reward attorneys for cases in which

they have not prevailed." Under the contingent fee system, the
client pays the attorney for sharing in the client's risk of loss, and
the client and lawyer have common economic incentives to succeed
with a minimum investment of time. 7 The risks of nonpayment
and delayed payment are of the utmost economic importance to a
contingent fee attorney, because they represent the attorney's
"opportunity wage."3 8 Fully compensatory attorney fees include
enhancements for exceptional success, and the contingent risks of
nonpayment and delay in payment.3" In order to provide
sufficient economic incentive for lawyers to supply their services

305. See supra notes 116-39, 152-70 and accompanying text (discussing these two risks);
AToNEy FEE AWARDS, supranote 5,§ 1.08, at 12-13; Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 903 (1984)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that "[l]awyers operating in the marketplace can be expected to
charge a higher hourly rate when their compensation is contingent on success than when they will
be promptly paid, irrespective of whether they win or lose."). If an attorney's hourly rate is $100, and
the attorney is faced with two claims both requiring ten hours of work: One with a certain fee, and
the other with a contingent fee and an 80% chance of winning, the attorney would normally charge
$125 to the contingent client. This would equate the two "expected" benefits, which is the benefit
multiplied by the probability that it will occur. ECONOMIC ANALYSIs, supra note 3, at § 1.2, p. 11.
In this example, the expected return for bath claims is $1,000:
$100/hour x 10 hours x 100% probability = $1,000
$125/hour x 10 hours x 80% probability = $1,000;
Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 73 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that the conventional wisdom is that
lawyers who work on a contingency basis must earn an hourly rate equal to some multiple to that
charged by lawyers paid in all cases). But see id., at 74 (disagreeing with conventional wisdom
because court had no experience with lawyers requiring higher rate in cases they win to be
compensated for cases in which they lose).
306. ATroRNEY FEF AWARDS, supra note 5, § 1.08, at 13. Just as a businessperson would take
into account the cost of goods sold but never paid for, so must an attorney account for that
percentage of the attorney's time for which the attorney will not be paid.
307. ATroRNLY FEE AWARDs, supra note 5,§ 1.08, at 13-14; see Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d
320, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the contingent fee arrangement aligns the interests of the
attorney and client, because the attorney gains only to the extent the client gains).
308. See ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 1.10, at 17-18 n.82 (defining 'opportunity
wage' as the compensation an attorney could obtain by representing clients paying a certain fee).
309. I, § 1.10, at 19.
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to civil rights litigants and other, courts must provide fully
compensatory fees that account for inherent risks. 1
Yet courts often ignore attorneys' concerns about risk when
determining fully compensatory attorney fees. At most, courts seek
to equate the expected return from a certain-fee case with the
expected return from a contingent fee case, in an attempt to make
the attorney indifferent between the two cases.3" This approach
assumes that attorneys are indifferent, or risk-neutral, between a
certain-fee and a contingent fee with the same expected return. 2
Economists believe that most people avoid risk, and are thus riskaverse. 3 Risk-aversion reveals that what courts consider a fully
compensatory fee may not be sufficient to attract counsel to
prosecute contingent fee cases. 4
Dague ignores the fact that attorneys are risk-averse, and seek
higher attorney fees in more uncertain cases. By eliminating the
contingency enhancement, the Court is, in effect, stating that
attorneys who take fee shifting cases will be paid at less than the
market rate. As a result, fewer attorneys will take fee shifting
cases, because attorneys typically have other cases available, with

more certain fees. This is what Justice Blaclun meant in his
dissent when he said that only underemployed attorneys will
continue to take fee shifting cases after Dague.315
Dague has affected how attorneys decide which cases to take.
Attorneys will feel the pinch of Dague in lower attorney fees or
increased competition for cases with more certain fees. However,

310.

Id.

311.

See supra note 305 and accompanying text (explaining the "expected return" concept).

312. EcONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, § 1.2, at 11. In the previous example, a person who
was risk neutral would be indifferent between taking the claim with a certain fee of $1,000 and the

claim with an 80% of a $1,250 fee.
313. Id § 1.2, at 11. In the previous example, a person who was risk averse would rather have
the certain $1,000 fee than take the 20% risk of receiving no fee. Risk aversion comes into play
under the English Rule as well. If a client has a 90% chance of winning $1,000, but a 10% chance
of losing and having to pay the opponent's $5,000 attorney fees, "a typical risk-averse, one-shot
plaintiff [would be un]willing to risk $5,000 to recover a $1,000 loss, even at highly favorable odds."
The English Rule, supra note 3, at 55, 57.
314. See ECONOMIC ANALYsIs, supra note 3,§ 1.2, at 11 (explaining risk-aversion).
315. See supranotes 224-39 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackaun's dissent in
Dague).
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fee shifting plaintiffs will be the ones who will really feel the pinch
of Dague, as they will be unable to attract competent counsel to
take their cases.3" Dague will unfortunately prevent meritorious
actions from being pursued, and result in added confusion in fee
shifting jurisprudence.317
B. Resulting Confusion in Fee Shifting Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court provided little guidance to
lower courts in City of Burlington v. Dague. The decision sends
mixed signals, and will operate poorly in terms of precedential
value. The Dague decision will serve as poor precedent for two
reasons. First, the Court purported to limit its holding to the two
fee shifting statutes involved, yet drafted a broad opinion with dicta
to entice lower courts. 318 Second, the Court purported to adopt
the plurality opinion in Delaware Valley 11, 319 yet wrote an
opinion at odds with that earlier opinion, leading to a curious
320
result.
The Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in Dague to
the two statutes involved: The SWDA and the CWA. 32 1 Yet the
Court provided dicta upon which lower courts could base a broad
interpretation of Dague.322 The Court noted that the language in
these two statutes is similar to many other fee shifting statutes, and
that the case law interpreting what is a reasonable fee applies
uniformly to all of the fee shifting statutes. 323 Thus, the Court
was providing a very limited holding, while also making a broad

316. See supra notes 224-44 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinions in
Dague).
317. See infra notes 351-87 and accompanying text (discussing the four ways to limit the
holding in Dague).
318. See infra notes 321-23 and accompanying text (discussing how the Daguedecision sends
mixed signals in terms of the breadth of the Court's holding).
319. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
320. See infra notes 324-29 and accompanying text (discussing how reconciling the plurality
opinion in Delaware Valley II with Dague leads to a curious result).
321. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638,2643-44 (1992).
322. See infra notes 330-43 and accompanying text (discussing how Dague has been broadly
interpreted by lower federal courts).
323. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.
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pronouncement regarding the unavailability of contingency
enhancements to the lodestar. Such mixed signals are a disservice
to lower courts who must rely on Supreme Court decisions,
because Dague can serve as precedent for a wide spectrum of
views regarding the availability of contingency enhancements to the
lodestar.
The second way in which the Court's logic in Dague is
confusing, thereby providing little guidance to lower courts, is the
Court's purported reliance on the plurality opinion in Delaware
Valley 11.324 The Court expressly adopted Justice White's
plurality opinion, and held that contingency enhancements were no
longer possible under the two fee shifting statutes involved in the
case.32 1 Yet in Delaware Valley II, Justice White had determined
that a contingency enhancement is permissible if the plaintiff would
have been unable to find an attorney to prosecute the plaintiff's
claim without the enhancement.326
Reconciling the Court's holding in Dague with its adoption of
Justice White's opinion in Delaware Valley I leads to a curious
result. Based on this language in Dague, one can only conclude
that a contingency enhancement is prohibited, except where the
plaintiff would not have been able to find counsel to take the
plaintiff's case without a contingency enhancement. 327 This is
confusing guidance for the Supreme Court to provide lower courts,
because this reconciliation of the two cases appears to conflict
directly with the Court's express holding in Dague. Thus, not only
may courts limit Dague to the two environmental statutes at issue,
the SWDA and the CWA, 328 but courts may also limit Dague to
cases where the environmental plaintiffs would have been unable
to attract competent counsel without a contingency enhancement.

324. Id (citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware
Valley 11), 483 U.S. 711, 715-27 (1987).
325. Dague, 112 S. CL at 2643-44.
326. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 731.
327. Perhaps the Court did not account for those cases where the plaintiff sues under the
SWDA or CWA, and yet could not obtain counsel without a contingency enhancement. One
commentator reads Dague in yet another way, as rejecting the award of attorney fees in excess of
the fair market value of the attorney's services. Settlement Incentives, supra note 2, at 2168.
328. See infra note 351 and accompanying text (discussing how to limit Dague in this manner).

1616

1993 / City of Burlington v. Dague
Besides serving as poor precedent, lower courts will have difficulty
applying the Court's logic, which will result in varied
interpretations of Dague.3 29
C. Broad nterpretation of Dague
The Dague Court expressly limited its holding to eliminate
contingency enhancements to the two environmental fee shifting
statutes involved in the case.33 However, the Court noted that the
wording in these statutes was similar to the language in many other
federal fee shifting statutes, and that the case law determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee applies uniformly to all of them.33 '
While it can be argued that the Court reached a narrow decision
applying only to two statutes, in actuality, the Court established a
broad principle to be applied in subsequent fee shifting litigation
in lower courts. 332 A broad interpretation of Dague could destroy
contingency enhancements under all fee shifting statutes, and in all
circumstances. This would undoubtedly decrease the number of
meritorious claims which impoverished civil rights and
environmental plaintiffs will bring, and result in less competent
counsel "substituting in" for the higher priced, and more competent
attorneys who have been handling these types of cases.
Lower federal courts have already begun to interpret Dague
broadly. Five of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have had
occasion to interpret Dague, and have uniformly interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision as marking the demise of contingency
enhancements to the lodestar under federal fee shifting statutes.333

329. See infra notes 330-43 and accompanying text (discussing how lower courts have begun
to interpret Dague broadly).
330. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643-44 (1992).
331. Id at 2641.
332. Id at 2641, 2643-44; see infra notes 333-43 and accompanying text (noting the broad
interpretation given to the Dague decision).
333. In re Nineteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., Nos.
91-1635, 91-1946,91-1636,91-1971,, 91-1641,91-1972,91-1645,91-2159,91-1646,91-2160,911647, 91-2258, 91-1648, 91-2259, 91-1649, 91-2360, 91-1650, 91-2261, 91-1651, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32372, at *46 (Ist Cir. 1992) (concurring opinion); Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 943 (lst
Cir. 1992); Broyles v. Benefits Review Bd. of the U.S. Dep't of Labor, 974 F.2d 508, 509 (4th Cir.
1992); Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25613, at *21-22 (6th Cir. 1992);
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These courts of appeals have had little difficulty in extending
Dague to other statutes, such as the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 334 The First Circuit appears
willing to extend Dague even further, by possibly eliminating
contingency enhancements in equitable fund cases.335
Similarly, the federal district courts have consistently
interpreted Dague as removing the possibility of a contingency
36
enhancement to the lodestar in statutory attorney fee awards.
The district courts have also extended Dague to other fee shifting
statutes, including § 1988. 33' The district courts are in conflict
whether to extend Dague to eliminate contingency enhancements
in equitable fund cases.338
Thus, the lower federal courts have interpreted Dague both

broadly and inconsistently with each

other. Inconsistent

Wolfel v. Morris, Nos. 91-3607, 91-3661, 91-4142, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19043, at *23 (6th Cir.
1992); Smith v. Maywood, Nos. 91-3004, 91-3169, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18545, at *10 (7th Cir.
1992); Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir. 1992); Gates v.
Deukmejian, 977 F.2d 1300, 1311 (9th Cir. 1992).
334. Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 943; Wolfel, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *23-24; Gates, 977 F.2d at
1311; cf. Smith, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *10 (remanding the case, for the district court to decide

whether Dague applies to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
335.

See In re Nineteen Appeals, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *48-53 (1st Cir. 1992) (concurring

opinion) (noting that Dague'sreasoning applies to risk multipliers in equitable fund cases, particularly
when case is a hybrid between common fund and statutory fee shifting, and use of lodestar method
provides a more reasonable attorney fee award).
336. Artis v. U.S. Indus. and Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 805 F. Supp.
609, 610 (N.D. IMI.1992); In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. (In re Bolar II), No. CV-89-1726, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13261, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Ermlerv. Town of Brookhaven, No. CV 90-2781,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11950, at *87 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Finkelstein v. Bersna, No. C 83-5125, 1992

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15817, at *72-73 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 74 (C.D.
Cal. 1992); Hernandez v. Morales, No. 88-1578, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19748, at *5 (D.P.R. 1992);
Miner v. City of Glens Falis, No. 89-CV-918, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17370, at *58 (N.D.N.Y.
1992); Petramale v. Laborers' Int'l Union, No. 81 Civ. 4817, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12811 at *19

(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Snarr v. Sullivan, No. 89-20360, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19089, at *10 (M.D. Cal.
1992); Watkins v. Fordice, 807 F. Supp. 406, 416 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Weinberger v. Great Northern
Nekoosa Corp., Nos. 89-0270, 89-0273, 89-0291, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12073, at *65 (D. Me.
1992); Maloney v. Secretary of Dep't of Health and Human Services, No. 90-1034V, 1992 U.S. Cl.

Ct. LEXIS 324, at *22 (CI. Ct. 1992).
337. Finkelstein, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15817, at *72-73; McDonald v. McCarthy, No. 890319, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9934, at *5, (F.D. Pa. 1992); Watkins, 807 F. Supp. 406, 416 n.21.
338. Compare In re Bolar I1, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13261, at *14, 17-18 (holding that
Dague'sprohibition on contingency enhancements extends to common fund cases) with Weinberger,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12073, at *64 (holding that Dague does not apply in non-statutory fee
shifting cases).
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interpretations of Dague will only lead to uncertainty in the law,
which, in turn, will promote litigation. 339 Potential litigants are
more likely to sue when the case could go either way.340
Moreover, uncertainty in the law causes society to lose faith in the
judicial system. 4 '
In addition, Dague has created different rules in federal and
California state courts regarding the propriety of contingency
enhancements to the lodestar or "touchstone" figure. Differing rules
promote forum shopping, by providing an incentive to bring fee
shifting claims in California state court where a contingency
enhancement still exists. Different rules also lead to inequitable
administration of the law. Defendants who would be liable in a
California state court for enhanced attorney fees, could avoid entry
of an enhanced attorney fee award by removing the case to federal
court based on diversity of citizenship. Thus, defendants could
impact their liability "solely because of the fortuity that there is
diversity of citizenship between the litigants. 342
Moreover, the ability to limit Dague to environmental statutes,
or to statutory fee shifting in general, or to those federal circuits
with a pure lodestar approach will also lead to non-uniformity in
fee shifting jurisprudence. These are just a few of the methods by
which to circumvent the Dague decision. 3
D. Methods to Circumvent Dague
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Dague,
attorneys may simply raise their rates in order to recoup the

339. From Here to Attorney's Fees, supra note 287, at 235.
340. G. Robert Blakey, Symposium Law and the Continuing Enterprise, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
Rav. 1073, 1078 (1990).
341. See Miller v. Arizona Bank, 42 P.2d 518, 527 (1935) (stating that uncertainty in the law
undermines public confidence in the judicial system).
342. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980).
343. See infra notes 344-96 and accompanying text (discussing possible ways to circumvent
Dague).
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necessary higher return to compensate for their risk.3" Provided
that a substantial number of attorneys raise their rates in a given
market, this higher rate would become the local benchmark to use
in lodestar calculations, and Dague will have been effectively
circumvented.
It may be possible to limit Dague in four other distinct ways.
First, the Court itself in Dague limited its holding to two
environmental statutes. 45 Second, the Dague decision appears
limited to statutory fee shifting, without affecting fee shifting under
equitable doctrines." 6 Third, Dague may be limited to those
jurisdictions which embrace the lodestar approach, without
affecting to the same degree those jurisdictions that have combined
the lodestar and Johnson347 twelve factor approaches.348 Finally,
as a federal case interpreting federal law, Dague's effect can be
limited to federal claims. 3 49 In addition, enhancements to the
lodestar for exceptional success and delay in payment are still
available after the Court's decision in DagueY °
1. Dague Applicable Only in Environmental Arena

344. See Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69,77 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that if a higher, large
firm rate were uniformly granted, this would easily attract competent counsel to even the most
undesirable cases); U (questioning if this is what the Supreme Court intended after its decision in
Dague);supra notes 404-19 and accompanying text (discussing the financial theory of compensating
for risk). But see Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that Dague'srejection of contingency as an enhancement to the lodestar similarly dictates that
contingency not be a factor in setting billing rates); Watkins v. Fordice, 807 F. Supp. 406, 416-17
(S.D. Miss. 1992) (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that Dague does not apply to their case because
they are not seeking an enhancement of the lodestar, but an enhancement of their hourly rates).
345. See supra notes 205-7, 321-23 and accompanying text (discussing how the Dague Court
expressly limited its holding); infra notes 351-55 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court's
language in Dague may be used to limit the decision).
346. See infra notes 356-64 and accompanying text (discussing how Dague should be limited

to statutory fee shifting).
347. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); see supra notes
83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Johnson case).
348. See infra notes 365-70 and accompanying text (discussing how Dague's effect may be
limited in those jurisdictions that do not exclusively follow the lodestar approach).
349. See infra notes 371-87 and accompanying text (discussing how Dague may be limited to
federal claims).
350. See infra notes 388-96 and accompanying text (discussing how these two enhancements
to the lodestar are still available).
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The Court limited its express holding in Dague to the two
environmental statutes involved, the SWDA and the CWA.35t
Even if the Court provided dicta in Dague from which courts can
interpret the decision broadly, a sound argument can be made to
limit Dague to environmental fee-shifting statutes. The language in
environmental statutes differs from the language in the civil rights
counterparts.352 Environmental statutes typically give the court
broad discretion to award attorney fees when "appropriate. '' 353 In
contrast, civil rights statutes only permit the court to award attorney
fees to a "prevailing party." 35 4 Moreover, the Hazardous
Substance Superfund facilitates recovery under environmental
statutes. There is no functional equivalent to the Superfund in civil
rights legislation. Thus, there may be less risk of nonpayment in
the environmental arena than in the civil rights arena, and therefore
less need for a contingency enhancement.
For these reasons, an attorney may effectively argue that the
Dague decision is limited to environmental statutes. As a result, all
three enhancements, for delay in payment, exceptional results and
contingent nature of recovery, would still be available under fee
shifting statutes outside of the environmental arena. Even if a lower
court believes that Dague is not limited to environmental fee
shifting statutes, attorneys should be able to limit Dague to
statutory fee shifting.355
2. Dague Applicable Only to Statutory Fee Shifting
Dague may also be limited to attorney fee awards under federal
fee shifting statutes, as the case had nothing to do with fee shifting

351. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643-44 (1992).
352. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing civil rights and environmental
fee shifting statutes).

353. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (surveying environmental fee shifting
statutes); supra note 58 (discussing Ruckeishaus, where the Supreme Court limited courts' broad
discretion to award attorney fees when "appropriate" to plaintiffs who, at least partially,prevailed).
354. See supranotes 53-55 and accompanying text (surveying civil rights fee shifting statutes).
355. See infra notes 356-64 and accompanying text (discussing how Dague should not apply
to fee shifting under equitable doctrines).
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35 There are other
under equitable doctrines.
situations when
awarding attorney fees is appropriate, most notably in the common
fund area. A litigant, whose efforts have created a fund from which
others obtain benefit, can require the beneficiaries to contribute to
the costs of litigation, including attorney fees. 57 Common fund
cases differ from cases brought under fee shifting statutes.
Common fund cases are primarily shareholder derivative class
actions,3 5 whereas statutory fee shifting cases can be brought by
a whole range of persons. Common fund cases also differ from
statutory fee shifting cases in terms of their magnitude. Attorneys
who bring class actions to recover a common fund award are
'
essentially in "big business."359
Attorneys who bring contingent

fee cases under fee shifting statutes are essentially in "small
business."'3" Moreover, common fund awards of attorney fees are
based primarily on a fair percentage of the fund,36 ' whereas
statutory fee shifting awards of attorney fees are based primarily on
time spent on the case.362
Due to the fundamental differences between equitable and
statutory fee shifting, courts developed different guidelines for
calculating attorney fees in the two areas. 63 The Supreme Court
has not eliminated contingency enhancements under equitable
doctrines. Thus, the arguments of the Court in Dague should not
apply with equal force in an equitable fee shifting case. This
permits class-action attorneys to effectively distinguish Dague.
Attorneys in jurisdictions which do not strictly follow the lodestar
64
approach may also be able to distinguish Dague.

356. See supra notes40-42, infra notes 371-74 and accompanying text (discussing how attorney
fees may be shifted under three equitable doctrines).
357. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 111), 20 Cal. 3d 25, 35, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309, 141 Cal. Rptr.
315, 318 (1977) (citing Quinn v. State, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167, 539 P.2d 761, 764, 124 Cal. Rptr. 1,
4 (1975)).
358. See ATroRNEY FEE AWARDS, supra note 5, § 1.04, at 6.

359. Id § 1.08, at 14.
360. Id
361. Id, § 1.07, at 12.
362. Id
363. See id § 2.06, at 39-43.
364. See infra notes 365-70 and accompanying text (discussing how jurisdictions that follow
a combination of the lodestar and Johnson twelve factor approaches may limit the Dague decision).
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3. Dague Applicable Only in Lodestar Jurisdictions
Those federal circuits that have blended the lodestar and
Johnson twelve-factor approaches may be able to limit Dague's
effect in a third way. 5 Attorneys can argue, not for an

enhancement to the lodestar, but for higher attorney fees based on
those Johnson factors not necessarily subsumed in the lodestar.366
These factors may include: Opportunity cost of accepting a
particular case;" time limits imposed by the client or the stage
in the judicial process; and the undesirability of the client's
case.368 These factors are outside of the lodestar model, and were

unaffected by the Dague decision.
Dague dealt exclusively with contingency enhancements to the

lodestar, and circuits which have chosen to blend the lodestar and
Johnsontwelve-factor approaches should be receptive to increasing
an award of attorney fees for other Johnson factors not subsumed
in the lodestar. 69 Not only is Dague's holding circumscribed in

365. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (identifying those circuits, including the Ninth
Circuit, which have blended the lodestar and Johnson approaches).
366. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,434 n.9 (1983); see Davis v. City and County of San
Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Dague as merely eliminating another
Johnson factor, for the contingent nature of the fee); Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 75 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (perceiving Dague as neither holding that lodestar is always the beginning and end of
calculating reasonable attorney fees, nor in expressly rejecting Johnson factors, but as merely adding
contingency as another Johnson factor to list of factors necessarily subsumed within lodestar).
367. See supra note 308 and accompanying text (discussing how opportunity cost is a
consideration under financial theory to support contingency enhancements).
368. ArroRNEY FnE AWARDs, supra note 5, § 4.36, at 173-74; see Gomez v. Gates, 804 F.
Supp. 69, 76-77 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that Dague did not eliminate the possibility of an
enhancement to the lodestar to reflect the undesirability of a particular case, especially where the
plaintiff is unlikely to prevail for reasons not having to do with the merits of the underlying claim,
difficulty in establishing those merits, or the quality of the attorney's services, but rather, having to
do with the unattractiveness of the plaintiff); Hernandez v. Morales, No. 88-1578, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19748, at *5 (D.P.R. 1992) (noting that after Dague, a court will still adjust the lodestar for
factors other than contingency, such as complexity of legal issues involved, or grueling nature of
services to be performed); Snarr v. Sullivan, No. 89-20360, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19089, at *8
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (considering whether any of the Johnson-Kerrfactors applied in present case). But
see Davis, 976 F.2d 1536, 1548-49 (noting that Dague can also be read as casting doubt on the
relevance of a case's desirability to the calculation of reasonable attorney fees).
369. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 473, 484 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that
under a "hybrid approach," a court may adjust the lodestar for Johnson factors not included in the
lodestar calculation).

1623

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol 24
several of the federal circuits, Dague may be limited to federal
claims alone.37
4. Dague Applicable Only in Federal Court
California fee shifting jurisprudence is independent from federal
fee shifting jurisprudence. This realization is the basis for
concluding that the Supreme Court's decision in Dague does not
apply to California state claims in any court.
In determining whether to award attorney fees not covered by
fee shifting statutes or prior agreement, California courts rely on
three equitable principles:37' (1) The "common fund"
doctrine;372 (2) the "substantial benefit" doctrine;373 and (3) the
"private attorney general" doctrine.374 Although the United States
Supreme Court rejected the private attorney general doctrine in
actions based on federal law,37 the California Supreme Court

370. See infra notes 371-87 and accompanying text (discussing how Dague may not apply to
California state claims brought in any court).
371. See generally Jineen T. Cuddy, Comment, Fee Simple? Indeterminable: Inconsistent
ProceduresRegardingAttorney Fees and PostingAppeal Bonds, 24 PAC. LJ. 141 (1992) (providing
background information on California fee shifting jurisprudence, and examining the procedural
requirements involved in posting appeal bonds).
372. The common fund doctrine permits a litigant, whose efforts have created a fund from
which others obtain benefit, to require the beneficiaries to contribute to the costs of litigation,
including attorney's fees. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano RID, 20 Cal. 3d 25,35,569 P.2d 1303, 1309, 141
Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 (1977) (citing Quinn v. State, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167, 539 P.2d 761, 764, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 4 (1975)).
373. The substantial benefit doctrine is similar, and permits a litigant, whose efforts have
procured a judgment that confers a substantial benefit on members of an ascertainable class, to
recover attorney fees. Serrano 11I,
20 Cal. 3d at 35, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
374. The private attorney general doctrine encourages suits enforcing a strong public policy and
benefiting a large class of people, by awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs who successfully sue
persons infringing on important statutory and constitutional rights. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n.
v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 933, 593 P.2d 200, 208, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 511 (1979); see CAL.
CIV. PROc. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1992) (codifying the private attorney general doctrine).
375. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); see supra note 54
and accompanying text (discussing the battle between the United States Supreme Court and Congress
on the private attorney general doctrine). The private attorney general doctrine and the resulting
.entrepreneurial litigation" are not without critics. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV.
215, 216 (1983) (discussing how there are "perverse incentives" for the lawyer as entrepreneur).
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adopted the private attorney general doctrine in Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano xJJ).376
In Serrano III, the California Supreme Court indicated that the
"touchstone" for calculating reasonable attorney fees was a
compilation of the time spent and a reasonable hourly
compensation.37 7 The California Supreme Court then provided a
list of relevant factors to adjust this touchstone figure.378 The
"touchstone" in California fee shifting parlance is equivalent to the
"lodestar" of federal fee shifting, and the Serrano III factors are
comparable to the possible enhancements in federal court, as well
as a few of the Johnson factors. A contingency enhancement is the
3
third factor listed in Serrano 111. 11

380
Serrano III remains sound precedent in California.
California fee shifting jurisprudence is completely independent
from federal fee shifting jurisprudence, with its own principles,
statutes and precedents. The United States Supreme Court's
decision in City of Burlington v. Dague381 is controlling in

376. 20 Cal. 3d 25,569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977). See generally 7 B. E. WrrKIN,
CALUFORNIA PRocEDuRp, Judgment§ 171 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the California Supreme
Court's decision in Serrano III). Shortly before the Serrano III decision was filed, the California
Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, which codified the private attorney general
concept. See Woodland Hills, 23 Cal. 3d at 932, 593 P.2d at 208, 154 Cal. Rptr. 511 (discussing the
differences between the private attorney general under SerranoIII and under Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1021.5).
377. Serrano II1, 20 Cal. 3d at 48-49, 569 P.2d at 1316, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
378. 1I at 49, 569 P.2d at 1316-17,141 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The California Supreme Court listed
seven factors: "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in
presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by
the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual
victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award; (4) the fact that
an award against the state would ultimately fall upon the taxpayers; (5) the fact that the attorneys in
question received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing law suits of the character
here involved; (6) the fact that the monies awarded would inure not to the individual benefit of the
attorneys involved but the organizations by which they are employed; and (7) the fact that in the
court's view the two law firms involved had approximately an equal share in the success of the
litigation." Id.
379. latat 49, 569 P.2d at 1316-17, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
380. See, e.g., Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 4 Cal. App. 4th 807,5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
770 (1992); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459 (1991); Press
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 3d 311, 667 P.2d 704, 193 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1983); Serrano v. Unruh
(Serrano IV), 32 Cal. 3d 621, 652 P.2d 985, 186 Cal. Rplr. 754 (1982); Folsom v. Butte County
Assoc. of Gov'ts, 32 Cal. 3d 668, 652 P.2d 437, 186 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1982) (following SerranoIII).
381. 112 S.Ct. 2638 (1992).
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federal statutory cases, whether they are brought in federal or state
courts. 8 2 However, Dague is not controlling over California state
law claims, whether they are brought in California state courts, or
in federal courts based on diversity of citizenship.38 3 Under the
Rules of Decision Act, a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction over a California state law claim must apply California
state law. 384 Thus, a contingency enhancement is still possible
under California law.
A federal court with diversity jurisdiction over a California fee
shifting case would be required to apply California state law.
California state law continues to recognize the validity of a
contingency enhancement to the lodestar or "touchstone" figure.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court's decision in City of

382. See, e.g., 7 B. E. WrrKIn, CALIFoRNLA PRoCEDURE, Judgment § 162 (1985 & Supp. 1992)
(noting that California courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over civil rights actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and may award attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988). This is a slight
simplification, since a state court applying federal law must be cognizant of the "inverse-Erie
doctrine." JACK H. FRmENTHAL Er AL, CIviL PROCEDuRE, § 4.8, at 232-34 (1985) (referring to Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The principal question under the inverse-Erie doctrine
is how much leeway a state court has in following its own procedural rules. FRmDENTIAL, supra §
4.8, at 233. The question in the present context is whether a California state court interpreting a
federal fee shifting statute would feel compelled to follow the Dague decision. In an action brought
in a California state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51, the
California Supreme Court permitted additur, even though the United States Supreme Court had held
that additur was unavailable in federal court. Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 835, 427
P.2d 988, 997, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 285 (1967); see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482 (1935)
(holding that the use of additur in the federal courts violates the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution). Yet in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown RailroadCo., the United States
Supreme Court reversed the state practice of refusing to grant a jury trial, holding that trial by jury
was too important a part of the substantive rights provided under FELA to be eliminated in a state
action. Dice, 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952). Arguably, permitting a contingency enhancement to the
lodestar would be more akin to additur, and not nearly as important of a federal interest as the right
to trial by jury. Thus, California state courts interpreting federal fee shifting provisions may be able
to apply Serrano III rather than Dague, and permit enhancements to the lodestar.
383. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 confers jurisdiction to federal courts over the subject matter of disputes
"between citizens of different states," provided that the amount of damages sought is greater than
$50,000.28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988); see supra notes 380-82 and accompanying text (explaining how
California's fee shifting jurisprudence is independent of federal fee shifting jurisprudence, and thus
Dague is not controlling).
384. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) (stating that "[t]he laws of the several states.. . shall be
regarded as rules of decisions in civil actions in courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.-). California law continues to recognize the validity of a contingency enhancement to the
"touchstone" or lodestar figure.
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Burlington v. Dague385 is not controlling over a California State

cause of action, whether it is brought in a California State or

federal court.3"6 Even in those courts where Dague is controlling,
there are two remaining enhancements to the lodestar which are
still available.387
5. Other Enhancements to Lodestar Still Available
After Dague, there remain other possible enhancements which
may take the sting out of the Court's decision in Dague 88 Since
the Court in Dague did not address the availability of any other
type of enhancement to the lodestar,389 such enhancements are
arguably still available after Dague. Under Missouri v. Jenkins,39
enhancement is still possible for delay in payment. 9 Under Blum
v. Stenson,3 2 enhancement is still possible for exceptional

385. 112 S. CL 2638 (1992).
386. This is not to say that Dague is unimportant to an attorney practicing law in California.
First, no federal court has yet ruled on whether application of the decision in Dague is truly outcome
determinative, and California state claims in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction may
ultimately be subjected to Dague's restrictions on contingency enhancements. Second, Dague is of
course applicable to California attorneys who practice before the federal bench. Third, Dague's
constraints on contingency enhancements encourage California attorneys to factor this information
into their decisions on whether to take the case, which claims to pursue, and which court in which
to pursue them. Finally, the California Legislature or California Supreme Court could decide to
follow the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Dague, and it would be helpful for California
attorneys to anticipate this decision, perhaps in order to lobby against it.
387. See infra notes 388-96 and accompanying text (discussing the two remaining
enhancements to the lodestar).
388. See supra notes 333, 336 and accompanying text (explaining how lower federal courts
have interpreted Dague as eliminating contingency enhancements).
389. See generally City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992) (focusing on the
contingency enhancement to the lodestar).
390. 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
391. See, e.g., Broyles v. Benefits Review Bd. of the United States Dept. of Labor, 974 F.2d
508, 510 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that although Dague prevented the court from awarding a
contingency enhancement to the lodestar, the court could compensate for delay in payment by using
current, rather than historical, hourly rates); McDonald v. McCarthy, No. 89-0319, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9934, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that Dague does not preclude a lodestar enhancement
for delay in recovery); Petramale v. Laborers' Int'l Union, No. 81 Civ. 4817, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12811 at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpreting Dague as holding that the only possible enhancement to
lodestar in contingent fee cases is an adjustment for delay in payment); see supra notes 116-139 and
accompanying text (discussing an enhancement for delay in payment).
392. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
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results.393 The fact that other enhancements to the lodestar may
still be available partially ameliorates the effect of Dague on a
court's determination of reasonable compensation for attorneys.
This is because enhancements are often considered concurrently in
determining a multiplier to the lodestar,394 and post-Dague courts
may be more willing to use the remaining enhancements to better
approximate the market value of the attorney's services.395
Despite the ameliorative effect of these circumventions around
Dague, the confusion in fee shifting jurisprudence, the unequal
treatment of similar claims, and the deterrent effect of Dague on
bringing meritorious claims, should convince legislative bodies to
provide further guidance in the fee shifting arena.39

E. Need for Legislation in Fee Shifting Arena
City of Burlington v. Dague397 represents the Court's most
recent gloss on the relatively straight-forward lodestar
approach. 98 Although the lodestar method is not overly complex,
it is the source of many problems and is widely criticized.399
Attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis usually know how
much the client owes and usually have little difficulty securing
payment. 400 In contrast, attorneys who work for attorney fee

393. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., Nos. 89-0270,89-0273, 89-0291,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12073, at *69-70 (D. Me. 1992) (holding that contingency enhancement is
no longer available under Dague, but that multipliers are still available for the quality of
representation, and results obtained); Snarrv. Sullivan, No. 89-20360, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19089,
at *9 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that multiplier for exceptional success is still possible if quality of
service rendered was also superior); Watkins v. Fordice, 807 F. Supp. 406, 417 (S.D. Miss. 1992)
(determining that enhancement for exceptional level of success survives Dague,but was inappropriate
in the present case); see supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text (discussing an enhancement to
the lodestar for exceptional results).
394. See ATroRNEY FEE AsARDs, supra note 5, § 4.39, at 175.
395. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing how the enhancements to the
-lodestar approximate the market value of the attorney's services).
396. See infra notes 397-413 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress and the state
legislatures should clarify fee shifting).
397. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
398. See supranotes68-110 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the lodestar
approach).
399. New Fee Award Procedure,supra note 5, at 867.
400. Id. at 870.
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awards under fee shifting statutes, often have no way of knowing
when or how much they ultimately will be paid.4"' A victory at
trial offers no assurance of prompt payment, as the conclusion of
the adversarial battle on the merits marks the beginning of a
protracted struggle over attorney fees. 4"
It is clear that the lodestar system must be improved. The
lodestar approach already wastes adjudicatory resources by often
requiring a second litigation concerning attorney fees.40 3 After the
confusion caused by Dague, the lodestar approach will be even
more wasteful. One commentator suggests that the time has come
to reduce the dispensation of fees to a routine, bureaucratic process
which delivers payments efficiently, predictably, in appropriate
amounts, and with a minimum of litigation."
The President's Council on Competitiveness4 5 advocates
adopting a modified English Rule,' 6 with indemnification of the
winner's attorney fees limited to the loser's own legal costs.40 7

Yet it is generally accepted that the English Rule discourages
privately funded parties from bringing meritorious claims. 408 The
English Rule also includes provisions which mitigate the loser-pays
principle for certain segments of the population. 4 9 These limits
on the English Rule would need to be imported as well in order to
avoid inequities in the rule's application.410
Now that the Supreme Court appears to have lost sight of the
purposes behind federal fee shifting provisions, legislative bodies
are in the most advantageous position to effect change in the
401.
402.
403.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 962.

404. Id at 962.
405. The President's Council on Competitiveness was chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle.
The English Rule, supra note 3, at 55.
406. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing the English Rule).
407. Settlement Incentives,supra note 2, at 2156. Application of the new rule would be limited
to diversity cases in federal courts. Id.
408. The English Rule, supra note 3, at 55. Of course, the American Rule may encourage
parties to bring meritless claims. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship
Model, 77 MICH. L REV. 63, 65 (1978) (noting that the American Rule decreases a will contestant's
potential loss, which decreases the contestant's disincentive to litigate an improbable claim).
409. The English Rule, supra note 3, at 55-56.
410. Id.
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lodestar process by enacting appropriate federal legislation. 11
Congress and the California Legislature412 need to establish
workable rules regarding the determination of reasonable attorney
fees. For example, it would be advantageous for statutes to
expressly define what factors courts must consider in determining
a fully compensatory fee. These factors should include possible
enhancements to the lodestar for the risks inherent in fee shifting
cases. In addition, limits could be set on attorney fee awards, either
in dollars or as a percentage of the damages award, in order to
address the Dague Court's concerns." 3 It is clear that Congress
and the California Legislature must react to the Dague decision,
before the Supreme Court further erodes the incentive for attorneys
to take fee shifting cases.
IV. CONCLUSION

Congress and the California State Legislature have enacted a
plethora of fee shifting statutes.414 Fee shifting statutes promote
private enforcement of important laws, most notably civil rights
and environmental protection provisions.4" 5 In interpreting these
fee shifting statutes, courts developed the lodestar model as a

411. See supra notes 305-17 and accompanying text (discussing how the Supreme Court's
decision in Dague leads to a less than fully compensable award of attorney fees, which was one of
the purposes behind the enactment of federal fee shifting statutes).
412. The California Legislature needs to react to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Dague because California state claims may ultimately be subjected to Dague's restrictions on
contingency enhancements for two reasons. First, the United States Supreme Court may hold that
federal claims brought in California state court based on concurrent jurisdiction are subject to
Dague's analysis. Second, the California Supreme Court could decide to follow the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in Dague. See supra note 386 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of the Dague decision to California attorneys).
413. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West Supp. 1992) (setting the rate at $100 per hour
and limiting the attorney fee award to $7,500); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1031 (West Supp. 1992)
(limiting the award of attorney fees to 20% of the damages award).
414. See supra notes 44-67 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of Congress' and the
California State Legislature).
415. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638,2644 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes behind fee shifting statutes); see
supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (surveying typical civil rights and environmental protect; ,n
statutes).
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means to compute reasonable attorney fees. t6 Courts recognized
the inherent limitations of the lodestar model, however, and
permitted enhancements to the lodestar to account for excluded
factors.417
By eliminating the possibility of any enhancement to the
lodestar for the contingent risk of nonrecovery, 418 the United
States Supreme Court's holding in City of Burlington v. Dague 9
will deter claims brought under federal fee shifting provisions.
Dague could also negatively affect claims brought under California
fee shifting statutes, if either the California Legislature or the
California Supreme Court decide to follow Dague's confused
analysis.420
There are a number of ways to circumvent the Dague
decision.42 However, regardless of any ability to limit Dague's
effect, Dague will have a negative impact on some plaintiffs'
ability to find competent counsel for their federal claims, and may
ultimately have an impact on similar claims under California state
law. As dissenting Justice Blackmun noted, by preventing attorneys
from receiving full compensation under these fee shifting
provisions, Dague will harm more than the legal profession. Dague
will prevent many plaintiffs from filing meritorious claims, because
fee shifting plaintiffs will be unable to attract competent counsel to
take their cases.422 Less experienced and less capable attorneys
will prosecute those claims which plaintiffs do file, thereby

416. See supra notes 68-110 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the lodestar

model).
417.

See supra notes 111-170 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of enhancements

to the lodestar).

418.

See supra notes 330-43 and accompanying text (discussing how the Dague decision

effectively has eliminated the contingency enhancement).
419.
420.
Dague).
421.
Dague).
422.
turn away

112 S.Ct. 2638 (1992).
See supra notes 255-317 and accompanying text (criticizing the majority opinion in
See supranotes 344-96 and accompanying text (discussing the various ways to circumvent
See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text (discussing how risk-averse attorneys will
from fee shifting cases to cases with more certain fees).
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weakening protection of important state and federal rights.423 Fee
shifting plaintiffs and attorneys no longer can wish upon the
lodestar for reasonable attorney fees.
James P. Benoit

423. See supra notes 224-39 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Dague).
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